Wyoming Law Review
Volume 20

Number 1

Article 5

2020

Wyoming's DIY Project Gets Western with the UCC
Matt Crockett

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Crockett, Matt (2020) "Wyoming's DIY Project Gets Western with the UCC," Wyoming Law Review: Vol. 20 :
No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Crockett: Wyoming's DIY Project Gets Western with the UCC

WYOMING L.AW REVIEW
VOLUME 20

2020

NUMBER 1

WYOMING'S DIY PROJECT GETS WESTERN
WITH THE UCC
Matt Crockett*
I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION

.......................................................

ACT AND ITS GENERAL
SECTION 101: DEFINITIONs

THE

STRUCTURE

.............................

..................................

A.
B.
C
D.
E
F
IV.

V.

......... 109

DigitalAsset
...................................
......
DigitalConsumerAsset..........................
DigitalSecurity.......................................
Virtual Currency
.........................................
Section 101(b) ' Mutually Exclusive Rule............
................
Other DefinitionalMatters
.........................
.....
SECTION 102: CLASSIFICATION OF DIGITAL ASSETS
.......................
A.
In General
....................................
......
B.
Virtual Currency Under Article 9...................
.......
1.
Section 102(b): The Opt-in Provision
...................
a.
In General.........................
.........
b.
Problems with Section 102(b) and
RequiredAssumptions
....................
......
c.
Section 104(f) ' Application to Section 102(b)...............

SECTION

A.
B.
C

103: PERFECTION, PRIORITY,

106
108

109
109
110
111

111
111
112
112
113
114
114
116
118

AND GOVERNING LAW...................118

Perfection
....................................
Control(Sections 103(b) and (e))..................
Priority Under Section 103(a) ................................

...... 118
........ 123
127

* Assistant Professor of Law, UNT Dallas College of Law; Of Counsel to Husch
Blackwell LLP The author would like to thank Ellen Pryor of UNT Dallas College of Law, Jeanne
L. Schroeder of The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, and William H.
Henning of Texas A&M University School of Law, for their terrific support and their feedback on
this Article. The author would also like to thank Javon Johnson, Texas Tech University School of
Law, Class of 2020, for editing this Article, and Andrea Tinianow, for discussing Wyoming's digital
assets act with the author.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2020

1

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 20 [2020], No. 1, Art. 5
WYOMING LAw REVIEW

106

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6

Vol. 20

Priorityin General;Article 9's First-to-File-or......
...............................
Perfect Rule
Assets are Proceeds of
Priority--Digital
................
OriginalCollateral .....................
That
Collateral
Original
Assets are
Priority-Digital
are Disposed of and the Debtor Obtains Non-Digital
Assets Proceeds....................................
Repledges Under Section 103(b) .................
........
Section 103(d)'s "Take Free"Rule........
........
Virtual Currency's Achilles Heel .....
a.
...................
Issue
Drafting
103(d)'s
Section
b.
Section 103(d)'s Minor Impact.............136
c.
.........
Section 103(d)' Terminology............
d.
.............
..........
Section 103(f): Governing Law

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

127
128

129
131
132
133
134
137
138

Governing Law Rules UnderArticle 9................... 138
................ 140
The Act's Governing Law Rule........

Multistate PriorityDisputes in a Non-Wyoming Court.. 141
Multistate PriorityDisputes in a Wyoming Court.......... 143
................... 144
Changesin GoverningLaw ..
144
.........................................
VI. OTHER ISSUES WITH THE ACT
144
.....
..............................
Provisions
Transition
A.
145
......
.............................
ConsumerProvisions
B.
146
........................................
ControlProvisions
C
Default and Remedies Provisions .............................. 147
D.
147
.........................................................
VII. CONCLUSION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Without uniformity, "horrendous complications may arise."'
Wyoming is angling to be "the Delaware of digital asset law."' This ambitious
goal stems from the rise of a new technology-blockchain-which has preoccupied
3
the globe in recent years. Blockchain is the technology underlying the well4
known cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. The technology facilitates a secure, decentralized

I U.C.C. §
2

9-701 cmt. 1 (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019).
Caitlin Long, What Do Wyoming's 13 New Blockchain Laws Mean?, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2019,

7:29 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/

2

019/03/04/what-do-wyomings-new-blockchain-

laws-mean/#2640f4465fde [https://perma.cc/HQW5-ANPQ] ("Wyoming is already the 'Delaware
of digital asset law,' a reference to Delaware's lead in corporate law.").
See Alan Cohn et al., SmartAfter All: Blockchain, Smart Contracts, ParametricInsurance, and
Smart Energy Grids, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REv. 273, 274 (2017).
4 See Tsui S. Ng, Blockchain and Beyond: Smart Contracts, A.B.A. Bus. L. TODAY (Sept. 28
2
2017), www.armericanbar.org/groups/business_1aw/publications/blt/ 017/09/09-ng.html [https://

perma.cc/B6V7-2NUW].
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database which stores transactions. 5 Blockchain ensures a high level of security,
reduces the risk of hacking, and has evolved into a major facilitator of transactions
in various industries.6 The emergence of blockchain, and its importance in
evolving and expanding economies, has led states like Wyoming to attempt to
create an attractive environment for those utilizing the new technology.?
Wyoming has been at the forefront of enacting blockchain-friendly regulations, recently creating a legal framework intended to welcome those utilizing
the new technology.' In the past two legislative sessions, Wyoming enacted
thirteen digital assets laws to facilitate an environment conducive to blockchain
technology and the businesses which operate using it.9 The end goal of these
new regulations is to attract companies using blockchain to the state, in hopes of
resulting in new jobs and revenue for the state in an ever-turbulent time for the
energy sector, eventually alleviating Wyoming's heavy reliance on a single major
revenue source.10
So far, it is unclear whether Wyoming's new legislation has been successful in
bolstering the state's economy." While the goal of diversifying Wyoming's economy
is laudable, much of the newly enacted legislation is muddled and hastily passed,
potentially causing confusing interpretations in light of longstanding doctrines.
Specifically, Wyoming enacted Wyoming Statute Sections 34-29-101 through
-105 (theAct) relating to "digital assets," which tookeffectJuly 1, 2019.12 The Act
substantially addresses secured transactions in digital assets, and therefore impacts
the operation of longstanding secured transactions doctrines found in Articles
8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), particularly as adopted in
Wyoming.1 3 While the Act's intentions are to attract more companies to the state
5 See

Cohn et al., supra note 3, at 277.
See id. at 289; see Ng, supra note 4 ("In its infancy stages, blockchain was the mechanism
that tracked cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. However, as the technology evolved, variations
such as private, permissioned, and consortium blockchains have emerged. Ultimately, blockchain
technology can facilitate many types of business transactions.").
6

' See Mead Gruver, Wyoming Tries to Attract Blockchain Business, CHmrrIAN SCI.
MONITOR (May 23, 2018), www.csmonitor.com/Business/2018/0523/Wyoming-tries-to-attractblockchain-business [https://perma.cc/X2S6-8BR4].

8 Id.
9 See Long, supra note 2.
"o See Gruver, supra note 7 ("The stakes are high as Wyoming struggles with low prices for
oil and natural gas and weak demand for coal. The fossil fuels account for 20 percent of Wyoming's
economy, more than any other state, and the industry's recent weakness has saddled the state with a
$500 million deficit.").
" Id. ("A few bitcoin miners have asked about Wyoming's new blockchain laws, but nothing
major has come of the legislation just yet, said Ron Gullberg, business development director for the
Wyoming Business Council, the state's economic development agency.").
2

Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-101 to -105 (2019); Long, supra note 2.

3 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-101 to -105.
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under a favorable regulatory scheme, the Act actually leaves much to be desired
due to its inconsistencies with the current state of the law of secured transactions.
This Article is an annotation of the Act's provisions relating to Articles 8 and 9 as
4
well as a critique of the Act.'

II. THE AcT AND

ITs GENERAL STRUCTURE

A portion of the Act operates as a self-contained, miniature version of Article
9 for what the Act calls digital assets.15 Like Article 9, the Act has rules governing
6
collateral identification, perfection, and priority, in each case for digital assets.'
However, unlike the UCC, the Act has no official comments providing the
meaning or history of its particular sections. Further, as discussed in this Article,
many of the Act's most important secured transactions provisions are incoherent
or inadvisable, or they conflict with Article 9. Thus, this Article acts both as an
annotation of the Act and a critique of its provisions. To serve that purpose, this
Article is not organized on an issue-by-issue basis, but instead simply tracks the
provisions of the Act impacting Articles 8 and 9 from the beginning of those
sections in the Act to the end of those sections, much like a traditional treatise
would annotate a statute. The desire is that this organizational structure will make
this Article an easy reference guide for courts, practitioners, and others who are
construing individual sections in the Act.
This Article does not generally propose changes to the Act or offer solutions as
to how the UCC should deal with emerging technologies. 1 Much more can, and
will be, said about these issues in various other commentaries and model codes.
The Act contains four sections that relate to Articles 8 and 9: (1) Wyoming
Statute Section 34-29-101 (Section 101), which is definitional; (2) Wyoming
Statute Section 34-29-102 (Section 102), which classifies digital assets as certain
types of collateral under Articles 8 and 9; (3) Wyoming Statute Section 34-29103 (Section 103), which provides perfection, priority, and governing law rules
for digital assets; and (4) Wyoming Statute Section 34-29-104 (Section 104),
which deals with bank custodians. Wyoming Statute Section 34-29-106 is another
blockchain act, the Wyoming Utility Token Act, which this Article mentions
briefly below.

" For ease of readability, in most cases this Article references the model version of Article 9
rather than Wyoming's or any particular state's adopted version.

I See Wyo.
'6 Id.
17

STAT. Am.

§ 34-29-101(a)(i).

§§ 34-29-101 to -104.

These discussions would justify wholly separate articles.
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DEFINITIONS

Section 101 contains four definitions: "digital asset," "digital consumer asset,"
"digital security," and "virtual currency." Digital consumer assets, digital securities,
and virtual currency are individual types of collateral (similar to inventory,
accounts, et cetera under Article 9). The term "digital asset" is an umbrella term
that includes the other three types of collateral (much as "goods" under Article
9 includes consumer goods, equipment, inventory, and farm products).s The
following is a discussion of each definition as well as certain other definitional
matters in, or affecting, the Act.

A.

DigitalAsset

The Act defines "digital asset" as "a representation of economic, proprietary
or access rights that is stored in a computer readable format, and includes digital
consumer assets, digital securities and virtual currency."' 9
The definition covers "a representation of economic, proprietary or access
rights that is stored in a computer readable format," and also includes the defined
terms "digital consumer assets," "digital securities," and "virtual currency."20 The
term "include" seems to say that a digital asset may be something other than
a digital consumer asset, digital security, or virtual currency. However, that is
apparently not the case, since Wyoming defines the term digital consumer asset to
include any digital asset that is not a digital security or virtual currency.2 1 Wyoming
could have eliminated this confusing drafting circularity by defining a digital asset
only as a digital consumer asset, digital security, or virtual currency, and moving
the remainder of the definition into the catch-all portion of the definition of
digital consumer asset.

B. Digital Consumer Asset
The Act defines "digital consumer asset" as "a digital asset that is used or
bought primarily for consumptive, personal or household purposes and includes:
(A) An open blockchain token constituting intangible personal property as
otherwise provided by law; (B) Any other digital asset which does not fall within
[the definitions of digital security or virtual currency]." 2 2

" Wyo. STAT. ANN.
COMM'N 2019).
19 Wyo. STAT. ANN.
20

§ 34-29-101(a)(i);

U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt.

4

a (AM. LAW INsT. & UNIF. LAW

§ 3 4 -29-101(a)(i).

Id.

Id. § 34-29-101(a)(ii)(B) ("'Digital consumer asset' . . . includes. . . [a]ny other digital asset
which does not fall within [the definitions of digital security or virtual currency.]").
4 2
22 Id. § 3 - 9-101(a)(ii). As a minor drafting note, there should
be an "and" at the end of
subsection (ii)(A).
21
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This definition's reference to tokens would seemingly cover tokens like
those the Wyoming Utility Token Act refers to as "utility tokens". The terms
"consumptive" and "open blockchain token," which this definition uses, could
perhaps take the definitions assigned to them in the Wyoming Utility Token Act.
Under the Wyoming Utility Token Act, a consumptive token is generally one
23
that, in simple terms, is exchangeable for services or property. Compare that to
24
a virtual currency token-like Bitcoin-that is a store of economic value.
The definition uses the disjunctive "or"; it does not require that the asset
25
be both consumptive and for personal or household use. Thus, the definition
encompasses any consumptive open blockchain token, regardless of who owned
it and for what purpose. In other words, in spite of the word "consumer" in
26
the definition, these assets apparently may be held for commercial purposes.
In fact, one must read the definition to cover commercially held assets, because
subsection (B) is a catch-all provision which scoops up any representation of
economic, proprietary, or access rights stored in a computer readable format
27
that is not virtual currency or digital securities. By reason of subsection (B),
the term "digital consumer asset" is somewhat akin to Article 9's term "general
intangible" in that it acts as a catch-all for assets that do not fall into another more
specific definition. 28
Because "digital consumer assets" do not need to be "consumer" in nature,
Wyoming should have used a different term to avoid confusion. The term
"general digital asset," a nod to Article 9's "general intangibles," would have been
more effective.

C DigitalSecurity
The Act defines the term "digital security" as "a digital asset which constitutes
a security, as defined in WS. 17-4-102(a)(xxviii), but shall exclude digital
29
consumer assets and virtual currency." The Act defines "security" as it is defined
in Wyoming's Corporations, Partnerships, and Associations Statute, rather than as

§ 34-29-106(g)(ii).

23

Id

24

See id § 34-29-101(a)(iv)(A).
Id. § 34-29-101(a)(ii)(B).

25

26 See id. As will be discussed, the UCC contains important distinctions between assets held
as collateral in consumer transactions and assets held as collateral in commercial transactions. Thus,
the consumer/commercial distinction is important.
27 Id. § 34-29-101(a)(ii)(B).
28

Compare Wyo.

STAT. ANN.

INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N
29

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§

§

34-29-101(a)(ii)(B), with U.C.C.

§

9-102(a)(42) (AM. LAW

2019).
34-29-101(a)(iii).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss1/5

6

Crockett: Wyoming's DIY Project Gets Western with the UCC

2020

WYOMING'S

DIY

PROJECT

ill

defined in Article 8 of Wyoming's UCC.o Digital securities presumably include
ownership interests in assets or entities managed on a blockchain.

D. Virtual Currency
The Act defines the term "virtual currency" as "a digital asset that is:
(A) Used as a medium of exchange, unit of account or store of value; and (B) Not
3
recognized as legal tender by the United States government." ' This definition
includes cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and the various "alt-coins" which are
used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value.

E. Section 101(b)'s Mutually Exclusive Rule
Section 101(b) states simply, "[tihe terms [digital consumer assets, digital
securities, and virtual currency] are mutually exclusive." 32 This presumably means
that a digital asset must either be a digital consumer asset, digital security, or
virtual currency under the Act, but cannot satisfy two of those definitions at
4
any one time. The phrase was seemingly inspired by Official Comment a to
section 9-102 in Article 9, which states that "consumer goods," "equipment,"
"farm products," and "inventory" are mutually exclusive types of goods under
Article 9.33 In both Article 9 and the Act, it is important to delineate clear borders
between the various types of assets because Article 9 and the Act provide specific
rules based on the type of asset. 4

E

Other DefinitionalMatters

The location of the Act's codification in Wyoming's statutes, combined with
the Act's failure to properly cross-reference Wyoming's UCC, is problematic.
The Act is not codified in Wyoming's Uniform Commercial Code, which is in
Wyoming's Title 34.1, but instead at the end of Title 34 of Wyoming's statutes,
35
titled "Property, Conveyances and Security Transactions." The Act's statutory
location affects how the Act integrates into the UCC, and vice versa, just as
questions might arise about the relationship between any two other separately

3 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-102(a)(xxviii) (2019). Naturally, Article 9 defines "security" as it
is defined in Article 8. See U.C.C. § 9-102(b). A comparison of Wyoming's definition and Article
8's definition of the term is outside the scope of this Article.

§ 34-29-101(a)(iv).
§ 34-29-101(b).

1 Wyo. STAT. ANN
32 Id.
1

U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 4a.

3 9AWILLIAM D. HAwLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SEIGEs § 9-102:10 [Rev] (2019)
("The reason for the separate definitions is that each [type of collateral] has specific rules for
treatment as collateral."); see, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-102(a)(iii) (providing an example of a
delineation which applies only to virtual currency).

35 Wyo. STAT. ANN. %§ 34-29-101 to -105.
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codified state laws. The most important problem relates to definitions. The Act
uses several terms which the UCC defines: "debtor," "secured party," "security
interest," "financing statement," "value," and "agreement."36 Some of the terms,
like debtor and secured party, seem obviously intended to have the meanings
given to them in the UCC, as the Act would be impossible to understand without
them. The Act, however, makes no mention of adopting the UCC's definitions.3 7
The problem would not exist if the UCC somehow incorporated its terms into
the Act, but that is not the case. Under the UCC, the definitions in Article 1 of
the UCC (such as "agreement") only apply when used in Articles 1 through 9
of the UCC. Whereas, the definitions in Article 9 only apply to Article 9 unless
specifically covered by the definitional section of another law."
The Act also uses terms that the Wyoming Utility Token Act defines:
"blockchain," "open blockchain token," and "consumptive," in each case without
any cross-reference to the Wyoming Utility Token Act.3 9 As noted, perhaps those
definitions should apply to the Act, but there is no indication in the Act or the
Wyoming Utility Token Act whether that was intended.40

IV.
A.

SECTION

102:

CLASSIFICATION OF DIGITAL ASSETS

In General

Section 102(a) classifies the types of digital assets defined in Section 101 for
purposes of Articles 8 and 9, as follows:
(a)

Digital assets are classified in the following manner:
(i)

Digital consumer assets are intangible personal property and shall be considered general intangibles, as
defined in WS. 3 4 .1-9-102(a)(xlii), only for the purposes
of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, title 34.1,
Wyoming statutes;

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28); id. § 9-102(a)(73); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF.
LAw COMM'N 2019); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(39); U.C.C. § 1-204; id. § 1-201(b)(3). For example, the
term "secured party" is used eleven times in Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-103.
37 The reverse is actually true. The bill enacting the Act adds a new Section 1-210 to
36

Wyoming's UCC which states that that the Act "shall apply' to Wyoming's UCC. See Wyo.
ANN. § 34.1-1-210; S.F. 0125, 65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019).
3

-

STAT.

U.C.C. § 1-201(a); U.C.C. § 9-102(a).
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-106(g)(i),(b),(g)(ii); e.g., id. § 34-29-101(a)(ii) (using the

terms "open blockchain token" and "consumptive").
40 Whether this construction would be ideal is largely a question about the general applicability
of the definitions in the Wyoming Utility Token Act, which is outside the scope of this Article.
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Digital securities are intangible personal property and
shall be considered securities, as defined in WS. 34.1-8102(a)(xv), and investment property, as defined in WS.
34.1-9-102(a)(xlix), only for the purposes of articles
8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, tide 34.1,
Wyoming statutes;

(iii) Virtual currency is intangible personal property and
shall be considered money, notwithstanding WS.
34.1-1-201(b)(xxiv), only for the purposes of article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, title 34.1,
Wyoming statutes."
To summarize, Section 102(a) states that: (1) for purposes ofArticle 9 only, digital
consumer assets are general intangibles; (2) for purposes of Articles 8 and 9 only,
digital securities are investment property; and (3) for purposes of Article 9 only,
virtual currency is money, even though virtual currency does not qualify as the
definition of "money" in Article 1.42 Notably, the classifications are extremely
important under Article 9, because, as noted above, Article 9 provides specific
rules based on the type of asset.

B.

Virtual Currency UnderArticle 9

It is important for the purpose of later discussion to note a few issues with
respect to the treatment of digital assets under Article 9 (that is, under the law
of every state but Wyoming). The general consensus is that virtual currency is a
general intangible. A security interest in general intangibles may be perfected
only by filing.' Further, a transferee of general intangibles takes the general
intangible subject to an existing perfected security interest.4 5 This Article
discusses these issues further in connection with the discussion of Sections 102(b)
and 103 below.4 6

§ 34 -29-102(a).
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (providing the definition of general intangible); id. § 9-102(a)(49)
(providing the definition of investment property); U.C.C. § 1-201 (b)(24) (providing the definition
1

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

42

of money).
13

See 2

BARKLEY

CIARK & BARBARA CIARc, THE IAW OF SECURED TRANsACTIONS UNDER
§ 7.17, § 3 (3d ed. 2019); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Uniform Commercial Code, U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv., Spring, 2016, at 1, 8.

- U.C.C.

§ 9-310(a).

Id. § 9-315(a); see also id. § 9-317(d). As discussed below, this rule is particularly problematic
for virtual currencies that are used like money.
46 See infra footnotes 53, 163-64 and accompanying text.
15
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Section 102(b): The Opt-in Provision
a.

In General

Section 102(b) is an opt-in provision under which any digital asset may
be treated as a financial asset under Article 8. Section 102(b) simply states as
follows: "Consistent with WS. 34.1-8-102(a)(ix), a digital asset may be treated
as a financial asset under that paragraph, pursuant to a written agreement with
the owner of the digital asset. If treated as a financial asset, the digital asset shall
remain intangible personal property. 4 7
To provide context, it is important to understand Article 8's definition of
"financial asset," which states as follows:
(9)

"Financial asset," except as otherwise provided in Section 8-103, means:
(i)

a security;

(ii)

an obligation of a person or a share, participation, or
other interest in a person or in property or an enterprise
of a person, which is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded
on financial markets, or which is recognized in any area in
which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; or

(iii)

any property that is held by a securities intermediary for
another person in a securities account if the securities
intermediary has expressly agreed with the other person
that the property is to be treated as a financial asset under
this Article.

As context requires, the term means either the interest itself
or the means by which a person's claim to it is evidenced,
including a certificated or uncertificated security, a security
certificate, or a security entitlement."
Section 102(b) is presumably based on clause (iii) in the proceeding definition
of financial asset, which allows a securities intermediary and its customer to agree
upon treating as a financial asset property held by the securities intermediary
for the customer in a securities account.4 9 Some background is necessary to

17

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-102(b) (2019).

8 U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9) (AM. L~w INsT. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019).
49

CompareWyo.

STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-102(b), with U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9)(iii).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss1/5
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explain why this opt-in provision appears in the Act. For the past few years,
commentators have proposed using Section 8-102(a)(9)(iii)'s opt-in as means to
convert cryptocurrency from a general intangible into investment property." The
Uniform Supplemental Commercial Law for the Uniform Regulation of VirtualCurrency Businesses Act (the Supplement), which no state has yet to adopt, offers
the same framework." Briefly stated, the opt-in subjects an asset to Article 8's
indirect holding system, after which: (1) a secured party may perfect a security
interest in either the securities account (the account "holding" the digital asset) or
the securities entitlement (the customer's property interest in the digital asset) by
control or by filing; and (2) the asset becomes subject to transferee-friendly take
free rules by which a transferee takes free of existing claims, including perfected
security interests. 52 These transferee-friendly take free rules are a workaround to
the problem mentioned above that a general intangible cannot be transferred free
of a perfected security interest.53
Take note that commentators have proposed the Article 8 opt-in as a
means of working around the fact that Article 9's rules do not provide a good
framework for cryptocurrencies." An Article 8 opt-in would have presumably
55
been available for digital assets even if the Act was silent about it. This raises the
question of why the Act includes an opt-in provision, particularly considering
that many crypto-enthusiasts cringe at the idea of introducing a middleman (the
securities intermediary), as the most revolutionary aspect of cryptocurrency is its

* See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 43, at 47; George K. Fogg, Perkins Coie: The UCC and
Bitcoins- Solution to Existing FatalFlaw, COINDESK (Jan. 29, 2015, 7:16 PM), www.coindesk.com/
perkins-coie-bitcoin-can-learn-real-estate-law#_ftnref [https://perma.cc/X9BC-J3DJ].

11

NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAws, UNIFORM SUPPLEMENTAL COM-

MERCIAL LAW FOR THE UNIFORM REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BusINESSEs ACT 14

(2018),

www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=407376c3-f2a7-6c29-9283-c9eOa38eaaff&forceDialog=O [https://perma.cc/WU93JNT4]. The benefits of this opt-in are beyond the scope of this Article. But see Schroeder, supra note
43, at 48-78 (discussing, collectively, the benefits of the opt-in provision).
52 See U.C.C. § 8-106 (discussing control of a certificated security, uncertificated security,
and security entitlement); U.C.C. § 9-106 (AM. LAw INsT. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019) (discussing
control of investment property); U.C.C. § 9-312(a) (providing the option to perfect a security in
chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments, or investment property by filing); id. § 9-317(b);
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAws, supra note 51. The definition of "financial
asset," in conjunction with the definition of "securities account" in Section 8-501, sets the scope of
the indirect holding system rules of Part 5 of Revised Article 8. The Part 5 rules apply not only to
securities held through intermediaries, but also to other financial assets held through intermediaries.
Because the term security entitlement is defined in terms of financial assets rather than securities, the
rules concerning security entitlements set out in Part 5 of Article 8 and in Revised Article 9 apply to
the broader class of financial assets. U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 9.

5

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

5

Eg., Schroeder, supra note 43, at 47-48.

5 See id.
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decentralized peer-to-peer nature.56 There are two possible reasons. For one, it
may be that Section 102(b) simply ratifies the notion that digital assets may be
subject to the opt-in.57
The second reason might be explained by Section 102(c), which states: "A
bank providing custodial services under WS. 34-29-104 shall be considered to
meet the requirements ofWS. 3 4 .1-8-102(a)(xiv)." 5 As background on Article 8
and Section 102(c), parties cannot simply move property into Article 8's indirect
holding system by agreeing that the property is a financial asset.59 Rather, a
securities intermediary must hold the property in a securities account. 60 Because
an Article 8 opt-in involves a securities intermediary, the Act's drafters needed to
ensure that a custodian bank under Section 104, who might not fit Article 8's
definition of a securities intermediary, was deemed to be a securities intermediary
for purposes of Article 8.6' They accomplished that with Section 102(c).

b.

Problems with Section 102(b) and RequiredAssumptions

Although Section 102(b) does not provide for anything that Article 8 did not
already address, it was logical for the Act to confirm that virtual currency may
be subject to a financial assets opt-in. However, problematically, Sections 102(b)
and (c) raise many questions, and readers may need to make several assumptions
to make sense of the Act. For one, readers should probably assume that Section

56

Id. ("Although [the Article 8 opt-in] might be a work around of Article 9 for some bitcoin

owners, it would defeat one of the primary advantages of cryptocurrencies over conventional payment
systems such as checking accounts, credit or debit cards, automatic clearing house transactions, wire
transfers or money transmissions. This is precisely the ability to engage in person-to-person transfers
of value the need to use a mediating bank, broker or other institution.").
17 See id. at 47.
58 Wvo. STAT. ANN.

§

34-29-102(c) (2019).

See 7A WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND El AL., HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 8-102:4 [Rev] (2019)
(noting the fact that an asset may be a financial asset is virtually meaningless:
5

If one consults only the definition of the term "financial asset" in subsection
8-102(a)(9) one could conclude that any item in the universe-indeed perhaps
the universe itself-might well fit within the words of the definition . . .. The fact
that the definition of "financial asset" has virtually no limits tells us only that we
are proceeding down a blind alley if we seek to analyze some genuine legal issue by
asking merely "whether X falls within the definition of financial asset.
The fact that a certain obligation, interest, or other item of property may fall
within the words of the definition of financial asset in subsection 8-102(a)(9)
does not in itself trigger the application of any substantive provision of Article
8. Rather, Article 8 comes into play only if the item in question is in fact
held by a securities intermediary for an entitlement holder in a relationship that
fits within the definition of "securities account" and therefore gives rise to a
"security entitlement").
6'

U.C.C. § 8 -102(a)(9)(iii) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019).
See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-104; U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14).
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102(c), which speaks only of bank custodians, does not restrict securities
intermediaries to bank custodians; rather, any person who qualifies as a securities
intermediary could enter into a Section 102(b) opt-in agreement with the owner
of a digital asset.6 2 Readers should also probably assume that Section 102(b)'s
phrase "pursuant to a written agreement with the owner of the digital asset"
means an agreement between the owner and either the securities intermediary
or the bank custodian deemed to be a securities intermediary under Section
102(c).63 On this point, it is necessary to assume that, however the securities intermediary or bank custodian actually holds the digital asset-perhaps by keeping
record of the private key-the structure will qualify as a "securities account" as
required by Article 8's opt-in rules. It is also safe to assume that the drafters did
not mean for the UCC's definition of "written" to apply to "written agreement."
In the UCC, "written" essentially means tangible (printed, typed, or another
tangible form)." Because that word is too limiting to cover electronic agreements,
Article 9 uses the term "record" rather than "writing" to cover information that
is in an electronic (intangible) format as well as information that is written or
otherwise in tangible form."5 It would be rather ironic if Wyoming, it in its rush to
be on the forefront of digital assets laws, inadvertently required a tangible writing
for digital assets transactions.
Further, the ability to opt-in to the Article 8 indirect holding system
framework seems to establish that the UCC's perfection and priority rules apply
to digital assets that are treated as financial assets, even though the Act contains its
own (different) perfection and priority rules in Section 103. That is not necessarily
at odds with the Act, but it is worth noting. In a similar vein, readers should
probably assume that Section 102(b) does not prohibit a digital security, which
qualifies in its own right as a "security" under Article 8, and therefore as a financial
asset under clause (i) of that definition, from being treated as a financial asset even
though there is no written agreement between the securities intermediary and
owner of the digital security. Without this assumption, a reader could understand
Section 102(b) to require a written agreement any time a digital security is treated

62 Schroeder, supra note 43, at 59 ("[T]here are numerous bitcoin exchanges, wallets and
service companies-such as Coinbase-that might be able organize themselves in such a way as to
meet this definition by characterizing their relationships with their clients as securities accounts.").
This assumption is twofold: (1) section 102(c) does not appear to limit securities intermediaries to
only bank custodians; and (2) there does not seem to be a good reason that the Wyoming legislature
would have wanted to so limit the group of securities intermediaries.

63 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-102(b). That the Act fails to describe the counterparty to the
agreement is pretty sloppy drafting, but it only seems logical that this would be a two-party agreement.

- See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(43) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019).
65 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(31); U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 9a (AM. LAWINsT. & UNIF. LAWCOMM'N 2019).
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as a financial asset, which would impose an additional obligation not imposed by
Article 8.66

c.

Section 104(f)'s Application to Section 102(b)

Section 104(f) contains a provision that the drafters likely intended to relate
to the opt-in provision. The section states that "[a] bank and a customer shall
agree in writing regarding .

.

. the treatment of each asset under the Uniform

Commercial Code, title 34.1, Wyoming statutes if necessary."67
Article 9 generally does not allow parties to classify the treatment (i.e., type) of
any asset by written agreement.6 1 Such a rule would cause problems. For example,
assume a debtor and secured party "A" (SPA) agreed to treat the debtor's right to
payment as an account under Article 9 and later, the debtor and secured party
"B" (SPB) agreed to treat that asset as an instrument under Article 9. If SPA filed
a financing statement only against accounts, SPB would argue that SPA's filing
gave SPB no notice of an encumbrance against the debtor's right to payment,
since SPB classified the asset as an instrument. Since this result would be chaotic,
Article 9 itself almost always defines Article 9 collateral types; the parties do not.
It is doubtful that the drafters' intent was to allow a bank and customer to
reclassify a digital asset. Thus, it is logical to assume that Section 104(f) is merely
a reference to the fact that Section 102(b) permits a financial assets opt-in by
agreement of the parties.'9 If not, perhaps the "if necessary" language in Section
104(f) limits the subsection's application to truly borderline situations, but this
portion of Section 104(f) still does not make sense given Article 9's framework as
discussed in the prior paragraph.
V.

A.

SECTION

103:

PERFECTION, PRIORITY, AND

GOVERNING

LAw

Perfection

In general, "perfection" is a process by which a secured party provides a form
70
of public notice of its security interest. Perfection protects the secured party
6 This assumption seems logical, as Section 102(b) appears to ratify, not impose obligations
in addition to Article 8's opt-in framework. I have noted several assumptions to make sense of
Section 102. I should note that I did not arrive at these assumptions easily; rather, I reviewed the
Supplement and the commentary mentioned above and used my own knowledge of the UCC
in order to make educated assumptions as to what the Act's drafters were trying to accomplish.
Any one of the issues covered with respect to these assumptions could be a stumbling block for a
practitioner or a court trying to make sense of the Act.

67 Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§

34-29-104(f).

* This is almost always the case, but is not universally true, given that parties may change the
nature of an asset by a financial assets opt-in as discussed above.
69 Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-104(f); id § 34-29-102(b).

Peter E Coogan, A Suggested AnalyticalApproach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 19 (1963).
7o
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against claims of other secured parties, other creditors, and transferees of collateral
from the debtor.7 ' Section 103 provides for two methods of perfecting security
interests in digital assets: control and filing. The first sentence of Section 103(a)
authorizes perfection by control under the Act. It states: "Notwithstanding the
financing statement requirement specified by WS. 3 4 .1-9-310(a) as otherwise
applied to general intangibles or any other provision of law, perfection of a security
interest in a digital asset may be achieved through control, as defined in paragraph
(e)(i) of this section." 72 In turn, Section 103(c) apparently authorizes perfection by
filing. It states: "A secured party may file a financing statement with the secretary
of state, including to perfect a security interest in proceeds from a digital asset

pursuant to WS. 34.1-9-315(d)

."7

As discussed in Part IV of this Article, the drafters intended Section 103(e)
perfection by control to be the premier method of perfection under the Act,
giving a secured party with control priority over other security interests.7 4 The
opening part of the sentence recognizes that control under the Act is effective even
though it would not be an effective method of perfection for digital assets under
Article 9. That is the case because Article 9 requires a filing to perfect a security
interest in general intangibles, possession to perfect a security interest in money,
and, generally, either filing or control under Articles 8 and 9 to perfect a security
interest in investment property.75 The Act's drafters added the phrase "or any other
provision of law" after the Uniform Law Commission reviewed the introduced
version of the Act and sent a letter to the Wyoming Legislature (the ULC Letter)
pointing out that, because not all digital assets are general intangibles, the Act
needed additional language in order for its control rule to override all of Article
9's perfection requirements.7 1
Two Article 9 rules that do not apply to the Act, but probably should in
some form because they are closely intertwined with control, are those in Sections
9-314(b) and (c). Section 9-314(b) establishes when perfection begins and ends
for a security interest perfected by control. The rule only applies to security

7 9B WILLIAM D. HAWKIAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES §
72 Wyo. STAT. ANN.
3 4 -2 9-103(a).

9-308:1

[Rev]

(2019).

§

n Id. § 34-29-103(c).
" See infra notes 104, 132 and accompanying text.

* U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2019) (referencing the perfection of general intangibles); id. § 9-312(b)(3) (referencing the rule for perfection of money); id.
§ 9-312(a); id. § 9-314(a) (referencing collectively the rules for perfection of investment property).
" See Letter from Anita Ramasastry, President, Unif. Law Comm'n, to Tyler Lindholm,
Rep., Wyoming House of Reps. (Feb. 6, 2019), blockchainlawguide.com/resources/2019-02-06--Wyoming-Digital-Asset-UCC-Amendments--Letter-from-ULC-to-Wyoming-Legislature.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/GVT9-SFZU] [hereinafter ULC Letter].
n See U.C.C. § 9-314(b).
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interests perfected by control under Article 9, and, therefore, would not apply
78
to control under the Act. Section 9-314(c) provides a special rule for control of
investment property.79 The rule only applies to a security interest in investment
property perfected by control under Section 9-106, and, therefore, would not
apply to control under the Act.o
As to filing, the first part of Section 103(c) states that a secured party may
file a financing statement with the secretary of state." Section 103(c) has at least
three considerable flaws. First, it makes no mention about how to perfect security
interests in original collateral. It says only that "[a] secured party may file a
financing statement with the secretary of state," rather than that a security interest
82
may be perfected by filing a financing statement. Of course, it is obvious that
Section 103(c) was intended to provide that filing perfects a security interest-the
section would otherwise have no purpose.
Second, Section 103(c) does not specify whether a security interest in any
3
digital asset (or instead, only certain digital assets) may be perfected by filing. As
to the latter point, because Article 9 does not permit a security interest in money
(or deposit accounts) to be perfected by filing, the Act's drafters should have made
clear that filing a financing statement perfects a security interest in any digital
asset, including virtual currency (which is considered money for purposes of
Article 9)." The same policy reasons that prevent a secured party from perfecting
a security interest in money or deposit accounts by filing seem to apply to virtual
8
currency, but that discussion is largely outside the scope of this Article. 1
Third, readers of Section 103(a) could understand it to permit secured
parties to perfect their security interests by filing with the Wyoming Secretary
of State regardless of where the debtor is located (as defined in Section 9-307)."
The section is ambiguous on this point. However, it is unlikely that the drafters
intended to allow a filing with the Wyoming Secretary of State to perfect a security
interest in digital assets of a debtor located outside Wyoming. If the Act permitted
78 See id. (applying to a security interest in "deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, or

letter-of-credit rights .....

See id. § 9-314(c).

7
0

See id.

' Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§

34-29-103(c) (2019).

82

Id.

83

Id

6

See id. § 34-29-102(a)(iii).

Those policies ideally prevent creditor overreaching and protects depositary banks from
8
dealing with secured party filers. The same policy that protects banks would apply to custodians
holding virtual currency. Much more could be said on this issue as it applies to digital assets.
86 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-103(a); U.C.C. § 9-307 (AM. IAw INsT. & UNIF. IAw
COMM'N 2019).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss1/5

16

Crockett: Wyoming's DIY Project Gets Western with the UCC

2020

WYOMING's

DIY PROJECT

121

a secured party to file in Wyoming with respect to a non-Wyoming debtor, the
rule would naturally conflict with Wyoming's version of Section 9-301(1), which
requires secured parties to file in the state where the debtor is located.17 Given
that obvious conflict, readers should probably assume that Wyoming's version
of Section 9-301(1) eliminates or overrides any ambiguity in Section 103(a), and
as a result, a filing under Section 103(c) is sufficient only if the debtor is located
in Wyoming."
Applying Section 103(c) together with Article 9's rules for describing collateral in a financing statement (Sections 9-108(b)(3) and 9-504(1)), the following
are true: a filing covering "money" or "virtual currency" perfects a security interest
in virtual currency (but not "money" as defined in Article 1), a filing covering
"investment property" or "digital securities" perfects a security interest in digital
securities, a filing covering "general intangibles" or "digital consumer assets"
perfects security interest in digital consumer assets, and a filing covering "all assets"
or "all digital assets" perfects a security interest in any and all digital assets."
The portion of Section 103(c) which addresses proceeds states a secured
party may file a financing statement with the Wyoming Secretary of State to
perfect a security interest in proceeds from a digital asset pursuant to Wyoming's
Section 9-315(d). 9 o The mechanics of Article 9's proceeds perfection rules
(Sections 9-315(c) and (d)) are outside the scope of this Article; however, it is still
important to this discussion to note that, under Article 9, in certain cases a secured
party must take further action, such as filing a financing statement, to perfect
its security interest in proceeds pursuant to Section 9-315(d)(3). 9 ' This rule is
presumably what the Act's drafters considered when they drafted the proceeds
portion of Section 103(c). 92 Notice that Section 103(c) references "proceeds from
a digital asset," which could be any type of collateral, including assets that are
not digital assets (i.e., a debtor sells a digital asset (original collateral) and buys
inventory (proceeds)). 93 Perhaps the drafters instead intended to cover proceeds
consisting of digital assets or proceeds of digital assets consisting of digital assets
because proceeds from a digital asset are presumably already covered by Article 9.
Regardless of the drafters' intention with Section 103(c), Sections 9-315(c) and
(d) will presumably provide the rules for perfecting security interests in proceeds.

§ 34 .1-9-301(a)(1).
See Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 34 .1-9-301(a)(1); id. § 3 4 .1-9-501(a)(ii).
See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 3 4 - 2 9-103(c); U.C.C. § 9-504; id. § 9-108(b)(3)
Wyo. STAT. ANN.

8

"
89

(providing that a

financing statement may describe collateral by type).
9o

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 3 4 -29-103(c).

' See U.C.C. § 9-315(d)(3).
Compare Wyo. STAT. ANN.

92
N

See Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 3 4 -2

9-103(c) with, U.C.C.

§

9-315(d)(3).

4

§ 3 -29-103(c).
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As noted above, the Act does not address whether a secured party may
perfect a security interest in a virtual currency or a digital consumer security postSection 102(b) opt-in by obtaining control of the resulting securities entitlement
or securities account under the indirect holding system rules of Articles 8 and
so given that Section
9.94 But it seems obvious that a secured party could do
95
102(b) expressly authorizes this opt-in. The Act also fails to address whether
a secured party may otherwise perfect a security interest in a digital security
is
(investment property) by control under Articles 8 and 9, assuming control
possible.9 6 Arguably, the Wyoming Legislature answered both questions through
an amendment to Article 1 of Wyoming's UCC, which simply states that the Act
97
"shall apply" to the UCC. It is not clear what it means for one law to "apply"
to another, but one interpretation is that the UCC's rules apply to transactions
under the Act unless the Act overrides the UCC. In any case, it seems unlikely
that the drafters would have intended for the UCC's methods of perfection to be
unavailable given that the Act is silent on the matter.
To summarize, the following are, or appear to be, acceptable methods
is
of perfection for security interests in any digital asset under the Act that
original collateral:
9
Control under Section 103(a).

'

Do-

Filing under Section 103(c) (the rule likely applies only to
debtors located in Wyoming)."7
Control of a securities entitlement or securities account
following a Section 102(b) opt-in.'m

'

Filing against a securities entitlement or securities account
10
following a Section 102(b) opt-in.
Control of digital securities under Articles 8 and

9.102

See U.C.C. § 8-106 (AM. LAW INsT. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2019); U.C.C. § 9-106.
Similarly, the Act does not address whether a secured party may perfect a security interest postentitlement or
Section 34-29-102(b) opt-in by filing a financing statement against the securities
account.
securities
9

Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-102(b).
96 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-101 to -105; U.C.C. § 8-106; U.C.C. § 9-106. Note that

9

UCC control is different than control under the Act.
Sess. (Wyo. 2019).
9 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-1-210; see S.E 0125, 65th Leg., Gen.
'

See supra notes 72, 76 and accompanying text.

' See supra notes 73, 81-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
0
101

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.

102 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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B. Control(Sections 103(b) and (e))
As noted, one method by which a secured party may perfect a security
interest-indeed, the premier method under the Act-is by obtaining control. 10 3
"Control" is covered in Sections 103(b) and (e), which state in relevant part:
(b)

Before a secured party may take control of a digital asset
under this section, the secured party shall enter into a control
agreement with the debtor.'0 4

(e)

As used in this section:
(i)

(ii)

Consistent with subsection (f) of this section, "control"
... means the following:
(A)

A secured party, or an agent, custodian, fiduciary or
trustee of the party, has the exclusive legal authority
to conduct a transaction relating to a digital asset,
including by means of a private key or the use of
a multi-signature arrangement authorized by the
secured party;

(B)

A smart contract created by a secured party which
has the exclusive legal authority to conduct a
transaction relating to a digital asset. As used in this
subparagraph, "smart contract" means an automated
transaction, as defined in WS. 4 0-21-102(a)(ii),
or any substantially similar analogue, which is
comprised of code, script or programming language
that executes the terms of an agreement, and which
may include taking custody of and transferring an
asset, or issuing executable instructions for these
actions, based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of specified conditions.

"Multi-signature arrangement" means a system of
access control relating to a digital asset for the purposes

103 Note that a secured party's control of collateral under Article 9 excuses the secured party
from Article 9's authenticated security agreement requirement. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(D) (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019). While not a big issue, the Act could have included such a
rule for digital assets under a secured party's control.

11

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§

34-29-103(b) (2019).
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of preventing unauthorized transactions relating to
the asset, in which two (2) or more private keys are
required to conduct a transaction, or any substantially
similar analogue;
(iii)

"Private key" means a unique element of cryptographic
data, or any substantially similar analogue, which is:
(A)

Held by a person;

(B)

Paired with a unique, publicly available element of
cryptographic data; and

(C)

Associated with an algorithm that is necessary to
carry out an encryption or decryption required to
execute a transaction.10

The first sentence of Section 103(b) states a control agreement is required "before
a secured party" may obtain control.'0 Assuming the drafters intended for
UCC definitions to apply to the Act, the term "agreement" has the same meaning
as in Article 1 of the UCC, which broadly defines "agreement" to cover oral or
7
written agreements. o
Section 103(e) provides the "control" portion of the term "control
agreement."'os Subsection (e)(i)(A) states that "a secured party, or an agent,
custodian, fiduciary or trustee of the party," has control if it has the "exclusive legal
09
authority to conduct a transaction relating to a digital asset." As the ULC Letter
previously mentioned points out, the requirement of "exclusive legal authority" is
problematic because it theoretically allows the debtor to destroy a secured party's
control by granting another secured party authority to conduct a transaction, or
by simply revoking that authority. 1 o On that point, if a secured party allows a

"o' Id. § 34-29-103(e).
'

See id. § 34-29-103(b). Presumably the word "before" simply means that a control agree-

ment is necessary to obtain control.
107 See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3)

(AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019);

1B

DAvID

FRISCH, LAWRENCE's ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201:18 [Rev] (3d ed.

2018). If UCC definitions do not apply, Wyoming's common law definition of "agreement" would
presumably apply.
'

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-103(e).

1o9 Id. § 34-29-103(e)(i)(A). As a minor drafting note, the Act is missing either an "or" between
subsections (e)(i)(A) and (B) and an "and" between subsections (e)(ii) and (iii).

"0 ULC Letter, supra note 76, at 3.
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debtor to retain a private key relating to a digital asset, it is difficult to see how the
secured party would ever have "exclusive legal authority" to conduct a transaction.
It seems that it would have been desirable for debtors and secured parties if
the Act provided a control rule that does not require "exclusive" control.' That
would make the Act's control rule similar to Article 9's rule, which provides that a
secured party has control of a deposit account even though the debtor may access
the money in the deposit account.' 12 Similarly, such a rule would be harmonious
with Article 8's rule which provides for control of indirectly-held investment
property even though the debtor is permitted to conduct transactions with the
investment property.' 1 3
Under a non-exclusive control rule for digital assets, a debtor could not defeat
control even if it transacted the digital currency or gave control to another secured
party. Of course, the trade-off is that the Act would need a first-to-perfect rule
to handle situations where the debtor gives two secured parties control.1 1 4 Oddly,
there is some indication that the Act's drafters assumed that debtors would still
be able to conduct transactions with digital assets under the control of secured
parties: Section 10 4 (e) contemplates situations in which a bank custodian must
undertake transactions with digital assets based on customer instructions."' It is
not clear how that section is designed to interact with Section 103(e)'s exclusive
control rule.
Despite the objections above, subsection (e)(i)(A)'s control rule may be
workable in the short-term. A custodian should be able to establish an arrangement
where it takes the debtor's private key(s) and obtains exclusive control, thereby
depriving the debtor of the ability to conduct transactions with that digital
asset." 6 The debtor and secured party may presumably make the secured party's

n See Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§

34-29-103(e)(i)(A); ULC Letter, supra note 76, at 3.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019) ("[T]he debtor's
ability to reach the funds is not inconsistent with 'control."').
112

See U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 3 (AM.

%§ 8-106(f), 8-106 cmt. 4 (AM. LAw INsT. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019)
("There is no requirement that the control party's right to give entitlement orders be exclusive. The
arrangement might provide that only the control party can give entitlement orders, or that either the
entitlement holder or the control party can give entitlement orders."). It is not clear to me that the
Act's drafters appreciated that a secured party could take control of a deposit account or investment
property without cutting off the debtor's access or ability to conduct transactions.
113

See U.C.C.

"' See U.C.C. § 9-401(b) ("An agreement between the debtor and secured party which
prohibits a transfer of the debtor's rights in collateral or makes the transfer a default does not prevent
the transfer from taking effect."). Article 9 makes this type of trade-off. See, e.g., id. § 9-328(2)
(containing priority rules for security interests in investment property).
"5 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 3 4 -29-104(e).
116 See Schroeder, supra note 43, at 45 ("[A] form of control would be the creation of
a new
private key that would not be known by the debtor.").
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authority irrevocable by contract. However, in the long-term, it is unlikely Section
103's one-size-fits-all approach to control will suffice for the range of assets falling
under the umbrella of the term digital asset, or, for that matter, for a world in
which the debtor desires to have more autonomy to conduct transactions with the
digital assets.
The Act's control scheme contains a few other provisions worth analyzing.
Subsection (e)(i)(A) provides that a secured party may obtain exclusive legal
authority "including by means of a private key or the use of a multi-signature
17
arrangement authorized by the secured party."' The ULC Letter, written in
response to a draft of the Act that did not contain the phrase "authorized by the
secured party" in subsection (e)(i)(A), noted:
It is also unclear which party, in the case of "multi-signature
arrangement," has "control." If the intent is for the secured
party to have the exclusive ability to conduct transactions with
respect to digital assets in order to achieve "control," a multisignature arrangement" [sic] in which another party may block a
transaction may suggest that neither party has "control.""'
The drafters likely added the phrase "authorized by the secured party" to
address the ULC Letter. But this phrase is confusing because readers could
understand it to suggest that a secured party must simply permit, or authorize,
a digital asset to have a multi-signature arrangement attached to it. Presumably,
the drafters instead meant that a secured party has control of a multi-signature
digital asset if the secured party exclusively controls enough of the private keys
to execute a transaction."' Otherwise, as the ULC Letter notes, another person
with a private key could block the secured party's ability to conduct a transaction
relating to the digital asset.120
Subsection (e)(i)(B) is also unclear. Reading the lead-in to subsection (e)(i)
together with subsection (B), the sentence says, "control .. . means . . . [a] smart
contract created by a secured party which has the exclusive legal authority to
121
That set of words does not
conduct a transaction relating to a digital asset."
have any meaning. Perhaps changing subsection (e)(i)(B), as follows, would
provide the intended meaning (with the added and deleted words emphasized
in the following): "With respect to a smart contract created by a secured party,

117

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-103(e)(i)(A).

"' ULC Letter, supra note 76, at 3.
19 A multi-signature arrangement may be structured so that having some percentage of the
private keys (e.g., two out of three) is sufficient to execute a transaction.
120 ULC Letter, supra note 76, at 3.
121

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§

34-29-103(e)(i)(B).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss1/5

22

Crockett: Wyoming's DIY Project Gets Western with the UCC

2020

WYOMING's

DIY PROJECT

127

the securedparty which-has the exclusive legal authority to conduct a transaction
relating to a an underlyingdigital asset". But even as modified, it is not clear what
impact subsection (e)(i)(B) has, since subsection (e)(i)(A)'s exclusive control rule
122
seems to cover the secured party as to smart contracts.
Finally, Section 103 is internally inconsistent in that Section 103(b) requires
a control agreement between the debtor and secured party, while Section 103(e)
(i)(A) states that control occurs when not only a secured party but also an agent,
custodian, fiduciary or trustee of the party, has the exclusive legal authority to
12 3
conduct a transaction relating to a digital asset.

C. Priority Under Section 103(a)
In general, "priority" refers to the issue of which party has primary rights
24
when two or more people claim an interest in the same collateral.1 This subpart
considers three priority conflicts that may arise in connection with digital assets:
(1) conflicts over digital assets as original collateral; (2) conflicts over proceeds
consisting of digital assets; and (3) conflicts over proceeds consisting of nondigital assets collateral. As discussed below, the Act has its own conflicts with
Article 9 on these priority matters.

1.

Priority in General;Article 9's First-to-File-or-PerfectRule

The second sentence of Section 103(a) is a non-temporal priority rule which
states, "[a] security interest held by a secured party having control of a digital
asset has priority over a security interest held by a secured party that does not have
control of the asset."' 2 5 In other words, a security interest perfected by Section
103 control has priority over any other perfected or unperfected security interest
(referred to herein as the "control is king" rule). As discussed above, filing may
26
apparently perfect a security interest in digital assets.' And, a security interest in
digital assets as proceeds may also be perfected under Section 9-315.127 Section
103 control primes both security interests as well as unperfected security interests.
Section 103(a)'s "control is king" rule has some Article 9 precedent. For example,
under Section 9-328(a), a security interest in investment property perfected by
control has priority over a security interest perfected by filing, regardless of the

time of perfection.1 28

122

See id. §§ 34-29-103(e)(i)(A), (e)(i)(B).

123

Id. §§ 34-29-103(b), (e)(i)(A).

124

See generally U.C.C. § 9-322 cmt. 2 (AM.

125

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

126

Id. § 34-29-103(c).
U.C.C. § 9-315.

127
128

§

LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2019).

34-29-103(a).

Id. § 9-328(1).
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Article 9's starting point for any priority conflict between secured parties is
Section 9-322(a)(1)'s first-to-file-or-perfect rule, which is a timing-based rule
that gives priority to the first secured party to file a financing statement or the
first secured party to perfect.1 29 Article 9's non-temporal priority rules, such as
Section 9-328(a), only override the first-to-file-or-perfect rule because Sections
9-322(a) and 9-322(f)(1) collectively provide that the rule is subject to certain
non-temporal priority rules, such as Section 9-328(a).130
The Act, however, does nothing to override Article 9's first-to-file-or-perfect
rule with respect to Section 103(a)'s "control is king" priority rule.1 3 ' As a result,
Wyoming has created a conflict between its Article 9 and the Act. This conflict
could create instances where a secured party who filed against digital assets
before another secured party took Section 103 control will try to argue that it has
priority under Article 9's first-to-file-or-perfect rule. 132 While it is likely that the
drafters' intent was for Section 103(a) to override Article 9's first-to-file-or-perfect
rule, there is no language in the Act or elsewhere that definitively provides for
that conclusion.1 33

2.

Priority-Digital
Assets are Proceeds of OriginalCollateral

As noted, Section 103(a)'s "control is king" rule seems to establish that a
security interest perfected by control under the Act has priority over a security
interest in proceeds perfected under Section 9-315.134
Article 9 extends the first-to-file-or-perfect rule to proceeds via Section
9-322(b)(1), which provides that the time of filing or perfection as to a security
interest in original collateral is also the time of filing or perfection as to a security
interest in proceeds.' 3 5 The following modified version of Example 5 in Official
Comment 6 to Section 9-322 shows how this rule works:

129

Id. § 9-322(a)(1).

Id. § 9-322(a) (providing the first-to-file-or-perfect rule applies "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in [Section 9-322)."); id. § 9-322(f)(1) (providing that the first-to-file-or-perfect rule is
subject to "other provisions of this part."). Section 9-328 is in the same "part" of Article 9 as Section
9-322. See also id. § 9-322 cmt. 2 (providing "[r]ules that override this section include ... Section
9-328 (investment property) ..... ).
131 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-101 to -105.
130

132
133

See U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1).
See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-101 to -105. If this analysis seems nit-picky, note that

Section 103(a) expressly overrides another Article 9 general rule, Section 9-310(a), which requires a
secured party to file a financing statement to perfect a security interest subject to certain exceptions.

Id. § 34 -29-103(a); U.C.C. § 9-310(a).
134 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 3 4 -29-103(a); U.C.C.
13

§ 9-315.

U.C.C. § 9-322(b)(1).
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A obtains and perfects a security interest in D's existing and
after-acquired inventory. Later, B obtains and perfects a security
interest in D's accounts. If D subsequently sells inventory and
receives an account as proceeds, A will have priority in the
account over B because A was the first to file in the original
collateral (the inventory). This is true even though A's security
agreement and filing said nothing about accounts."'
However, as with the first-to-file-or-perfect rule, Sections 9-322(a) and
9-322(f)(1) collectively provide that certain of Article 9's control rules override
this proceeds version of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule.13 7 Take the following
example, which is a spin-off of the example just provided:
A obtains and perfects a security interest in D's inventory. D
sells inventory and receives investment property (securities),
which are proceeds. Later, B obtains a security interest in that
investment property and perfects by taking control. A would
claim priority under Section 9-322(b)(1), but B actually has
priority because Sections 9-322(a) and 9-322(f)(1) provide that
Section 9-328(a)'s non-temporal priority rule (discussed above)
overrides Section 9-322(b)(1)'s proceeds priority rule. 3
To apply this discussion to priority disputes under the Act, change the last
example so that the investment property is digital securities and B assumes control
of the digital securities under the Act rather than Article 9. The Act's drafters
presumably intended the result that B would take priority under Section 103(a).
However, that result does not necessarily follow under the Act since neither the
Act nor Article 9 causes Section 103(a) to override Section 9-322(b)(1).' 3 9 The
Act needs an equivalent to Section 9-322(f) that causes the Act to override Article
9 for purposes of proceeds priority.

3. Priority-DigitalAssets are OriginalCollateralThat are Disposed
of and the Debtor ObtainsNon-DigitalAssets Proceeds
Another priority conflict could arise where a digital asset is subject to two
security interests, with one perfected by control under the Act and the other
perfected by filing under the Act. If the debtor disposes of the digital asset and

See id. %§ 9-322(a)(1), (b)(1), cmt. 6.
'3 U.C.C. §§ 9-322(a), (f)(1). Note that Section 9-322(b)(1) applies only for the purposes of
Section 9-322(a)(1)'s first-to-file-or-perfect rule.
3" See U.C.C.
§§ 9-322(a), (b)(1), (f)(1).
13 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-101 to -105.
'
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obtains proceeds that are not digital assets, a question arises as to which secured
party has priority in the proceeds. The Act does not answer this question.
Article 9 addresses this basic issue as to other types of collateral in Section
9-322(c)(2). 4 o That section overrides the first-to-file-or-perfect rule in order to
give the secured party with control over certain types of original collateral (e.g.,
deposit accounts and investment property) either priority or the ability to obtain
priority in proceeds) 1 'The following modified version of Example 6 from Official
Comment 8 to Section 9-322 elaborates:
SP- 1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing.
SP-2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated
security. Debtor receives cash proceeds of the security. If the firstto-file-or-perfect rule of subsection (a)(1) were applied, SP-1's
security interest in the cash proceeds would be senior. Under
subsection (c), however, SP-2's security interest is senior. 142
The Act's failure to include a Section 9-322(c)(2)-equivalent leads to a
result that is very likely opposite from what the Act's drafters intended. Consider
this example:
SP-1 perfects its security interest in digital assets by filing under
the Act. SP-2 subsequently perfects its security interest by taking
control of the digital assets under the Act. Debtor receives cash
proceeds (money) of the digital assets.
The Act does not contain a rule that applies to this situation because the
proceeds are actual money and not digital assets.1 43 Because the first-to-file-orperfect rules of Sections 9-322(a)(1) and (b)(1) would therefore apply, SP-1's
security interest in the cash proceeds would be senior since SP-1 was the first to
file and the first to perfect in the original collateral.'" However, it is unlikely the
Act's drafters would have wanted this scenario to result in that outcome. Rather,
they presumably would have wanted an equivalent to Section 9-322(c) (2) in order
to preserve, or give SP-2 the ability to preserve, its priority in order to offer SP-2
the same protections Article 9 affords to an equivalent secured party.

See U.C.C. §

9-322(c)(2).
See id. Section 9-322(a)(1)'s first-to-file-or-perfect rule applies "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in [Section 9-322]," which means Section 9-322(c) overrides it. See id. § 9-322(a)(1). I
use the word "ability" because, in some cases, the secured party must take an additional step. See,
e.g., id. § 9-322 cmt. 8 (example 8) (requiring filing and control).
142 See id. § 9-322 cmt.
8.
1o
141

143

See Wyo.

144

U.C.C. §§ 9-322(a)(1), (b)(1).

STAT. ANN.

%§34-29-101 to -105.
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4. Repledges Under Section 103(b)
Section 103(b)'s second sentence allows "repledges" by a secured party with
control of a digital asset, by stating: "[a] control agreement may also set forth the
terms under which a secured party may pledge its security interest in the digital
asset as collateral for another transaction.""' A repledge occurs when a secured
party pledges the debtor's collateral as collateral in the secured party's own secured
transaction."' Section 9-207(c)(3) authorizes repledges, and Official Comments
5 and 6 of Section 9-207 discuss them. 117 Section 9-207(c)(3) does not apply to
digital assets because, by its terms, Section 9-207(c) only applies when a secured
party has possession or control under Sections 9-104, 9-105, 9-106, or 9-107,
and none of those sections apply to control under the Act. 14 Thus, it follows that
Section 9-207 does not apply to repledges under Section 103(b).
Incorporated into Section 9-207 is the premise that a debtor has the right
9
to redeem collateral when it repays its debt."' According to Official Comment
5 to Section 9-207, that rule is squarely set forth in Section 9-623; thus, there
50
is no reason for Section 9-207 to restate it.' Of course, a problem occurs when
a repledging secured party is unable to re-deliver collateral back to the debtor
rightfully redeeming it, given that the debtor is entitled to do so.' It follows that
Section 103(b), like Section 9-207, implicitly allows the debtor to redeem digital
52
assets collateral when it repays its secured obligation.1 To the extent the secured
party is unable to re-deliver the collateral back to the debtor, Official Comments 5 and 6 to Section 9-207 should be helpful in resolving conflicts.'15
Notably, Section 103(b)'s second sentence should seemingly be read in
connection with Section 104(k), which prohibits a bank custodian under Section
104 from repledging a digital asset. 5 4 Reading the two sections together, Section
103(b) apparently permits repledges only by other secured parties who have

145

Wyo.

STAT.

ANN.

§

34-29-103(b).

Note

that repledges

are

sometimes

called

"rehyporhecations."
146 U.C.C. § 9-207(c)(3), cmt. 5; see generally Kenneth C. Kettering, Repledge Deconstructed,
61 U. PrrT. L. REV. 45 (1999) (providing an in-depth discussion of repledges).
14
48
149
150
151
152

U.C.C.

§§

9-207(c)(3), cmts. 5-6.

Id. § 9-207(c).
Id § 9-207 cmt. 5.
Id.
See generally Kettering, supra note 146.
Compare WYo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-103(b) (2019), with U.C.C.

§

9-207(c)(3).

U.C.C. § 9-207 cmts. 5-6.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-103(b) ("A control agreement may also set forth the terms under
which a secured party may pledge its security interest in the digital asset as collateral for another
transaction."); id. § 34-29-104(k).
153
154
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security interests perfected by control, such as non-bank secured parties or bank
secured parties who are not custodians.
Section 103(b) is different than Section 9-207(c)(3) in one particularly
notable way. Under Section 9-207(c)(3), control automatically gives the secured
party the right to repledge."' In contrast, under Section 103(b), the debtor must
agree that the secured party may repledge in order for the secured party to do
so. 15 6 It is unclear whether, post-Section 102(b) opt-in, Article 9 or the Act would
govern repledges of digital assets. The prudent practitioner would thus be wise to
follow the more restrictive requirements of Section 103(b).

5.

Section 103(d)'s "Take Free"Rule

Section 103(d) is a "take free" rule for transferees of digital assets."' As
discussed below, take free rules are rules under which a buyer or other transferee
of an asset takes free and clear of a security interest given by the seller or transferor
to a secured party."' Section 103(d) states:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including
article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, title 34.1,
Wyoming statutes, a transferee takes a digital asset free of any
security interest two (2) years after the transferee takes the asset
for value and does not have actual notice of an adverse claim.
This subsection only applies to a security interest perfected by a
method other than control. 59
Article 9's general rule is that a security interest survives the disposition of
collateral. 60 Thus, if D grants SP a security interest in an asset, and D later sells the
asset to B, B takes the asset "subject to" SP's security interest, because SP's security
interest survives the disposition by D to B. This general rule, however, is subject
to several exceptions under which a transferee takes free of the security interest."'
From a transferee's perspective, Article 9's most transferee-favorable take free rule
is located in Section 9-332, which "enables most transferees (including nonpurchasers) of funds from a deposit account and most transferees of money to

15

U.C.C. § 9-207(c)(3).

156

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-103(b).

§ 34-29-103(d). The alternate terms "cut off" and "take free" are used in Official
Comment 2 to Section 9-301. When a security interest is not cut off, a transferee does not take free
of the security interest. Instead, the transferee takes "subject to" the security interest.
15

Id

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-317(b); id. § 9-320(a).
159 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-103(d).
158

16 See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1).
161 See, e.g., id. § 9-317(b); id. § 9-320(a).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss1/5

28

Crockett: Wyoming's DIY Project Gets Western with the UCC

2020

WYOMING'S

133

DIY PROJECT

take free of a perfected security interest in the deposit account or money."l62 As to
general intangibles, Section 9-317(d) is a take free rule for buyers of certain types
of collateral, including general intangibles, that are encumbered by unperfected
security interests.1 63 A transferee of general intangibles may not take free of a
perfected security interest absent the secured party's authorization.' The bottom
line is that Article 9's take free rules are not very favorable to transferees of general
intangibles. As to investment property, Article 8 and Section 9-331 provide an
extensive set of transferee-friendly take free rules.'16

a.

Virtual Currency'sAchilles Heel

Under Article 9, virtual currency has, at least in theory, a big take free
problem.'" Recall that virtual currency is a general intangible under Article 9.117
As noted, Article 9 does not have a take free rule for transferees of perfected
security interests in general intangibles. As a result, transferees of virtual currency
take subject to existing perfected security interests.' 6 s A blog post titled Is UCC
Article 9 the Achilles Heel of Bitcoin? noted this problem on March 10, 2014,
where Professor Robert Lawless described the issue as follows:

.

[Assume a bakery has a] loan from a bank secured by the
bakery's "inventory, goods, equipment, accounts, and general
intangibles." Such an arrangement would not be uncommon
and would effectively give the bank an Article 9 security interest
in all of the bakery's property that is not real estate, sometimes
referred to as a "blanket lien." When a customer pays the bakery
with bitcoins, those bitcoins certainly now become part of the
bank's collateral [because Bitcoin is a general intangible] . . .
When the bakery uses bitcoins to buy flour from a supplier, the
bank's security interest will continue to encumber them [see

UCC section 9-315(a)(1)] . . . . Further, the security interest

will remain with the bitcoins through subsequent transfers
(UCC § 9-325). A remote transferee of the bitcoins will take
the bitcoins subject to the bank's security interest

. . . .

The

Id. § 9-315 cmt. 2; see also id. § 9-332.
163 Id.
9-315 cmt. 2; see also id. § 9-317(d).
164 Id. § 9-315 cmt. 2; see also id. § 9-317(d).
165 See, e.g., id. § 9-331; U.C.C. § 8-303 (Am. LAw INsT. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2019); id.
8-502, id. § 8-503(e), id. § 8-510, id. § 8-511; Schroeder, supra note 43, at 48-78.
162

§

'66 The problem is only real, rather than theoretical, to the extent a secured party can and
does trace virtual currency through one or more transfers. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin are
particularly difficult to trace.

67 See Schroeder, supra note 43 and accompanying text.
168 CLARK

& CLARK,

supra note 43, at § 7.17.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2020

29

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 20 [2020], No. 1, Art. 5

134

WYOMING LAw REVIEW

Vol. 20

possibility of another party with superior property interest in
a bitcoin would seem to substantially dampen their utility as a
medium of exchange."
To summarize, if a debtor grants a security interest in its general intangibles (and
the secured party perfects), then any subsequent transfer by the debtor of virtual
currency to a third party is subject to the secured party's security interest.
The so-called Achilles heel problem creates two issues for the drafters of any
secured transactions law affecting digital assets: (1) how to handle existing digital
assets already infected with an upstream security interest; and (2) what take free
rules to apply going forward. The first issue may be substantial. For example,
of the 21 million Bitcoins that will ever exist, some 80% were already mined
7
1 Many of those Bitcoins may already be infected with
when the Act took effect.o
upstream security interests. 7 1
The Act does not address the first potential problem, at least directly.1 72
However, as discussed in Part V of this Article, the Act's lack of provisions that
transition the law from the UCC to the Act likely means that a security interest
in virtual currency, as a general intangible, that existed prior to the Act's effective
date, fell away on the Act's effective date unless the secured party had or obtained
a security interest in the virtual currency.1 73 This Article discusses the Act's attempt
to solve the Achilles heel problem, and the issues that attempt created, in the
following section.
b.

Section 103(d)'s DraftingIssue

As noted, Section 103(d) is a take free rule for digital assets. Problematically,
however, the lead-in to Section 103(d) causes its take free rule to override the
UCC's take free rules with a provision that, as discussed below, is far worse for
169 Bob Lawless, Is UCC Article 9 the Achilles Heel ofBitcoin?, CREDIT SLIPs (Mar. 10, 2014,
8:17 PM), www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/03/is-ucc-article-9-the-achilles-heel-of-bitcoin.
html [https://perma.cc/MKD5-72MG].The example did not even need to go this far. If the bank
merely had a security interest in inventory, it would still have a perfected security interest in the
virtual currency, to the extent traceable, as proceeds. See U.C.C. §§ 9-315(a)(2), (c), (d).

' See Bitcoins in Circulation, BLOCKCHAIN, www.blockchain.com/en/charts/total-bitcoins
[https://perma.cc/TYA9-9NGS] (last visited Nov. 18, 2019). Notably, given the privacy protections
built into many virtual currencies, it may be difficult for a secured party to trace its security interest
through a disposition.
171 See Alex Lielacher, Lost and Hodled - UnderstandingBitcoin's "Unspent Transactions",
BRVE
NEW COIN (Jan. 24, 2019, 5:00 AM), bravenewcoin.com/insights/lost-and-hodled-understandingbitcoins-unspent-transactions [https://perma.cc/ZE4X-K9FL]. Granted, a few million Bitcoins
have probably been lost and likely many more have simply never been transferred, meaning they
would have never picked up an upstream security interest.
172 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-101 to
-105 (2019).
171

See infra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss1/5

30

Crockett: Wyoming's DIY Project Gets Western with the UCC

2020

WYOMING'S

DIY PROJECT

135

transferees. Section 103(d) begins with the following lead-in, "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law, including article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
title 34.1, Wyoming statutes . .. ."7 Because "notwithstanding" means "in spite
of," the lead-in essentially says, "in spite of the UCC's take free rules, the following
is Wyoming's take free rule for digital assets . . . .""7 If Section 103(d) overrides
the UCC's take free rules with a take free rule that is worse for transferees, the Act
does not solve the Achilles heel problem discussed above.
The drafters of the Act very likely intended for UCC's take free rules,
particularly Section 9-332(a)'s take free rule for money (virtual currency) and
Article 8's take free rules for investment property, to apply to digital assets. The
drafters would likely capture their intent by re-drafting the lead-in to Section
103(d) as follows: "Without affecting the take free or cut off rules of any other
provision of law, including artide-9 articles 8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, title 34.1, Wyoming statutes . . ." This lead-in would leave unaffected,

rather than override, the UCC's take free rules. Alternately, the drafters may have
simply misunderstood the rule they created; had they understood, they likely
would have opted to allow the UCC's take free rules to solely apply.
There are several reasons to think the drafters did not intend the lead-in to
Section 103(d) to override the UCC's take free rules. First, the following blackline
comparing the enacted version of the Act against the early introduced version
reveals that the first draft of Section 103(d) was not a take free rule, but instead a
rule that reduced a perfected security interest to an unperfected security interest
post-transfer:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code, title 34.1, Wyoming statutes,
a puefcted transferee takes a digital asset free of any security
interest in a digi1 assu becomes unpulkud two (2) years after
a-the transferee takes the asset for value and does not have actual
notice of an adverse claim. This subsection only applies to a
security interest perfected by a method other than control.1 7 6
The lead-in to the introduced version of the Act probably did not override the
UCC's take free rules because the language that followed was not itself a take free
rule.1 77 However, the Act's drafters changed Section 103(d) after the ULC Letter
noted the original version was problematic because it was not a take free rule. 178

174

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

175

Notwithstanding, BLACK'S LAw

"6 Wyo.

STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-103(d).
DICnONARY

(11th ed. 2019).

§ 34-29-103(d); S.E 0125,65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019) (Introduced).

1'

See Wyo. S.E 0125 (Introduced).

178

ULC Letter, supra note 76, at 5.
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By changing the substance of Section 103(d) without changing the lead-in, the
drafters may have inadvertently superseded the UCC.
A second reason is that it would not be logical to allow a financial asset opt-in
under Section 102(b), and then turn around and override those rules with Section
103(d)." 9 Similarly, as explained below, there is little reason to classify virtual
currency as money other than to take advantage of Article 9's take free rule.
Article 9 has three material rules applicable to money: (1) that a security interest
in money may be perfected only by possession; (2) that money is "cash proceeds";
80
and (3) Section 9-332(a)'s take free rule.1
The first rule does not apply under the Act because the Act has its own rules
for perfecting security interests in digital assets."s' As to the second rule, this
82
Article discusses the matter of proceeds briefly above.1 That leaves the take free
rule as being the only substantially good reason to re-classify virtual currency as
money. Thus, it is unlikely the Act's drafters intended to override it. Apparently
two commentators think that the Act extends Section 9-332(a)'s take free rule
18 3
to virtual currency, which is perhaps some proof of what the drafters intended.

c.

Section 103(d)'s Minor Impact

Assuming Section 103(d) applies in addition to, rather than in spite of, the
UCC's take free rules, what transferee protections does Section 103(d) add? As
noted in the preceding discussion, Section 103(d) is less favorable for transferees
than most of the UCC's take free rules.' Under Section 103(d), transferees of

179

See Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§

34-29-102(b); id. § 34-29-103(d). As discussed in Part III of this

Article, Section 102(b) establishes favorable take free rules.
(AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019); id. § 9-102(a)(9)
("'Cash proceeds' means proceeds that are money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like."); id.

180 U.C.C.

§ 9-312(b)(3)

§ 9-332(a).
`8

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§§ 34-29-103(a), (c). It would not matter even if not covered by the Act,

because virtual currency cannot be possessed.
182 This rule is of little importance to virtual currency, largely because Article 9's proceeds
should properly deal with digital assets proceeds.
183 See, e.g., Long, supra note 2 ("[The Act] maps virtual currencies to the super-negotiability
rules of money under existing law. In plain terms, this means a bitcoin purchaser can buy bitcoin
free and clear of any pre-existing liens ..... ); Andrea Tinianow, A Split Emerges In Blockchain Law:
Wyoming's Approach Versus the Supplemental Act, FORBEs (Mar. 7, 2019, 12:41 PM), www.forbes.
com/sites/andreatinianow/2019/03/07/a-split-emerges-in-blockchain-law-wyomings-approach6
versus-the-supplemental-act/#10 a5217719a [https://perma.cc/B7WK-2Q9X] ("[Under the Act,]
virtual currencies, such as bitcoin, are imbued with super-negotiability under the UCC and may
be transferred freely and unencumbered by any adverse claims, except where the debtor and the
transferee have colluded in violation of the secured party's rights.").
184 See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
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perfected and even unperfected security interests take subject to those security
interests until a two-year waiting period expires. 18 5 Apparently the purpose of the
two year rule was "to match the statute of limitations for fraudulent conveyance
under federal bankruptcy law."'"' Since no other UCC take free rule has any
relationship to fraudulent conveyance law, the Act's rule seems ill-conceived.
As to virtual currency, Section 9-332(a)'s take free rule is so favorable to
transferees that nearly all transferees will take free of security interests at the
time of transfer and will never need Section 103(d)'s assistance. 7 Notably,
Section 9-332(a)'s take free rule is so favorable to transferees that it would allow
transferees to take free even if a security interest in virtual currency was perfected
by control under the Act.'18 As to digital consumer assets (general intangibles),
Section 9-317(d) provides a weak take free rule under which a transferee may
take free of only unperfected security interests.'18 9 While Section 103(d) would
clear a perfected security interest on general intangibles, its two-year waiting
period makes this benefit rather meaningless. More importantly, it may be that
the take free rules under Article 9 and the Act applicable to general intangibles are
undesirable when applied to digital consumer assets transferred by one consumer
to another consumer.' 90 That type of transfer should seemingly be free of an
unperfected security interest or maybe even certain perfected security interests;
such a rule would align with a consumer-to-consumer transfer of goods under
Article 9's "garage sale rule," which clears most security interests, including most
perfected security interests.' 9' As to transfers of digital securities or securities
entitlements arising from digital assets that are treated as financial assets via a
Section 102(b) opt-in (both of which are treated as investment property), Articles
8 and 9 provide a transferee-friendly set of take free rules.' 92

d.

Section 103(d)'s Terminology

Section 103(d) uses several terms that require further examination. Courts
have held that proper transferees under Section 9-332 include: (a) a donee who
takes by gift from the debtor, such as a charity; (b) a lender or general creditor,

15

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-103(d).

"6 Long, supra note 2.
187 See U.C.C. § 9-332(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAw COMM'N 2019).
188 See

id.

189

Id. § 9-317(d).

190

See Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-103(d); U.C.C. § 9-317(d).

See U.C.C. § 9-320(b). The "garage sale rule" is founded on the idea that, since consumer
buyers are unsophisticated, the law needs to clear security interests for them. The same thinking
would presumably apply to consumer-held digital consumer assets.
192 E.g., id. § 9-331; U.C.C. § 8-303 (AM. LAw INST. &
UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2019); id. §
191

8-502; id. § 8-503(e); id. § 8-510; id. § 8-511.
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whether secured or unsecured; and (c) a lien or judgment creditor who garnishes
funds from the debtor's deposit account."' A transferee must actually take
94
possession of the funds in order to become a transferee. Courts and practitioners
would likely consult Sections 1-204 and 8-105(A) to determine the meaning of
95
"value" and "notice of an adverse claim," respectively, as used in Section 103(d).'
It is not clear whether the transferee must be without notice of an adverse claim
only at the time of transfer or for the entire two-year period, but the rule appears
to require the latter.

6

Section 103(f): Governing Law

Because secured transactions sometimes involve parties and collateral
located in different jurisdictions, it is necessary for statutes dealing with secured
transactions to contain rules providing which jurisdiction's law governs perfection
and priority. Thus, Article 9 sets forth a series of rules providing which law governs
perfection and priority of security interests in collateral. 196
Section 103(f) is a governing law rule in the Act which states:
(f) Perfection by control creates a possessory security interest and
does not require physical possession. For purposes of article 9,
title 34.1 and this section, a digital asset is located in Wyoming if
the asset is held by a Wyoming custodian, the debtor or secured
party is physically located in Wyoming or the debtor or secured
97
party is incorporated or organized in Wyoming.1
This section discusses how that governing law rule fits into the UCC's
governing law framework.

a.

Governing Law Rules Under Article 9

'

The UCC applies freedom of contract rules under which the parties
to a secured transaction may choose the law that governs their transaction.
193

See U.C.C. § 9-332.

See Sonic Eng'g, Inc. v. Konover Constr. Co. S., 51 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 844, 2003 WL
22133874 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (judgment creditor was not a transferee under Section 9-332
where funds were never transferred); Zimmerling v. Affinity Fin. Corp., 14 N.E.3d 325, 328-30
(Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (where secured party intervened in the garnishment proceeding, no transfer
was made under Section 9-332 to judgment creditor). But see Stierwalt v. Associated Third Party
Adm'rs, 89 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 921, 2016 WL 2996936 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (applying Section 9-332
to protect a judicial lien creditor who did not actually receive funds from debtor's deposit account).
i9 See U.C.C. § 1-204 (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2019); U.C.C. § 8-105(a).
194

'

U.C.C. %§ 9-301 to -307.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-103(f) (2019).

1"

U.C.C.

16

§

1-301(a).
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However, Section 1-301(c)(8) expressly overrides that freedom with respect to
the law governing perfection and priority of security interests; those governing
law rules are set forth in Sections 9-301 through 9-307199 The reason the UCC

overrides the parties' freedom to contract is that matters of perfection and priority
"involve third parties who should not, on principle, be bound by the agreement
between the original parties to which they were not privy." 200 In other words, a
debtor and secured party are not allowed to determine the state where perfection
must occur (e.g., where a filing must be made), since other secured parties, lien
creditors, general creditors, and buyers are affected by whether the secured party
has a perfected security interest. 20 1
Which state's version of Sections 9-301 through 9-307 (the governing law
rules) should a court apply? The general rule-particularly important in a priority
dispute-is that a court should apply the governing law rules of the forum state.202
Thus, if a priority dispute is brought in a Texas court, that court should refer to
Texas's version of Sections 9-301 to 9-307 to determine which state's laws govern
perfection and priority. If a question arises as to how to classify collateral under
Article 9 in order to determine which section or subsection of Sections 9-301
through 9-307 applies, the court should, again, apply its forum state's Article 9.203
For example, if there was a question about whether an asset was an instrument or
a payment intangible for purposes of determining governing law, the court would
decide by applying the forum state's Article 9.
The Act's governing law rule must work with Article 9's governing law rules,
so it is important to set out Article 9's governing law rules pertinent to resolving
questions that might arise under the Act. First, Section 9-301(1) provides the

'

Id. § 1-301(c)(8); U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to -307.

20o 1 W1LLIAM

D.

HAWKIAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 1-301:4

[Rev] (2019)

[hereinafter HAWKIAND § 1-301:4].
201 Carlson v. Tandy Comput. Leasing, 803 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[A] fundamental
purpose of Article 9 [is] to create commercial certainty and predictability by allowing third party
creditors to rely on the specific perfection and priority rules that govern collateral within the scope
of Article 9."); HAWKLAND, supra note 200, at § 1-301:4.
202 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Wakefield Kennedy,
LLC v. State Capital Holdings, LLC, 614 Fed. App'x 929, 933 (10th Cir. 2015); Sturtz Mach.,

Inc. v. Dove's Indus., 83 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 425, 2014 WL 1383403 (N.D. Ohio 2014); Arthur
Glick Truck Sales, Inc. v. Stuphen E. Corp., 914 E Supp. 2d 529, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd on
other grounds, 577 Fed. App'x. 11 (2d Cit. 2014); Fishback Nursery, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 94
UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 484, 2017 WL 6497802 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (federal district court sitting in Texas
applying governing law rule of forum state, Texas, to priority dispute involving contracts governed
by Oregon law and farm products located in Michigan and Tennessee); In re Oak Rock Fin., LLC,
527 B.R. 105, 114-15 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Lance, 59 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 632, 2006 WL
1586745 (Bankr. WD. Mo. 2006).
203 Seitz v. Republic First Bank (In re GEM Refrigerator Co.), 512 B.R. 194,
201-02 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2014), as corrected, (June 13, 2014) (applying law of forum state to determine whether
asset was investment property or deposit account).
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general rule that the law governing perfection and priority is the law of the
2
jurisdiction where the debtor is located. 1 In turn, Section 9-301(2) contains an
205
Under Section 9-301(2),
exception to Section 9-301(1)'s debtor-location-rule.
if collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the law of that juris-diction governs
20 6
perfection and priority of a possessory security interest in that collateral.
Lastly, under Section 9-301(3)(C), if collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the
law of that jurisdiction governs "priority of nonpossessory security interest in the
collateral." 20 7 While these rules are sometimes difficult to understand and apply,
it is critical that anyone construing the Act fully understand the mechanics
of these rules so as to understand how the Act's governing law rule interacts
with them.

b.

The Act's Governing Law Rule

The first sentence of Section 103(f) states that perfection by control creates
a possessory security interest. 208 This is a legal fiction since digital assets are
intangible, and, therefore, cannot actually be possessed. The presumptive purpose
of the rule is to try to extend the umbrella of Wyoming's substantive law (i.e., its
UCC and the Act) over as many transactions as possible.
As noted, in most transactions, the law governing perfection and priority
209
But few debtors are
is the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located.
2 10
"located" in Wyoming under Article 9, given its small population. Thus, the
application of this rule would render the Act inapplicable to most transactions,
absent another binding rule. That other rule is contained in Section 103(f), which
triggers Section 9-301(2).211 Recall that Section 9-301(2) contains an exception
to the debtor-location-rule under which, if collateral is located in a jurisdiction,
the law of that jurisdiction governs perfection and priority of a possessory security
interest in that collateral. 2 12 Appreciating this exception, the Act's drafters likely

204
205

U.C.C. § 9-301(1).
See id. § 9-301(2).

206

Id

207

Id. § 9-301(3)(C).

208

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§

34-29-103(f) (2019) ("Perfection by control creates a possessory

security interest and does not require physical possession.").
20

U.C.C. § 9-301(1).

210 See U.C.C. § 9-307; QuickFacts: Wyoming, U.S. CENSUS BulE.u, www.census.gov/quickfacts/WY [https://perma.cc/5M4Z-4LP8] (last visited Nov. 18, 2019). The state's small population
results in few individual debtors as well as few companies being formed by individuals who form
companies in the state of their residence.
211 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-103(f); U.C.C. § 9-301(2).

§ 9-301(2) ("While collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that
perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a
governs
jurisdiction
possessory security interest in that collateral.").
212

U.C.C.
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figured that, if the Act caused control of digital assets to create a possessory security
interest, the Act could define the location of the collateral for purposes of Section
9-301(2) as broadly as reasonably possible.
To cast a wide net for its location rule, the remainder of Section 103(f)
broadly provides that "a digital asset is located in Wyoming if the asset is held by a
Wyoming custodian, the debtor or secured party is physically located in Wyoming
or the debtor or secured party is incorporated or organized in Wyoming." 1 3 Thus,
if Wyoming can convince custodian banks and other businesses (debtors and
secured parties) to establish operations in Wyoming, Section 103(f) will arguably
cause Wyoming law to govern those parties' secured transactions dealing with
digital assets. 2 14
The drafting of Section 103(f) is generally comprehensible. 2 1 5 Section 103(f)
actually appears quite smart in its attempt to wedge into Section 9-301(2) by
creating the legal fiction of location for a digital asset.2 1 1 But, while Section 103(f)
initially seems effective, as discussed in the following subpart, it actually leaves
Wyoming secured parties exposed in multistate priority disputes in non-Wyoming
courts and puts its own courts in a tough position in multistate priority disputes.

c.

Multistate Priority Disputes in a Non-Wyoming Court

In spite of the Act's ambitious governing law rule, a non-Wyoming court
in a multistate priority dispute involving a non-Wyoming debtor (with only
one secured party claiming perfection and priority under the Act) would likely
not even consider the Act. As noted, the court should start with the governing
law rules of its forum state, which would direct the court to the forum state's
Section 9-301 .217 The forum state's section 9-301(2) would not apply-despite
Wyoming's best efforts-because that state would not recognize intangible
digital assets as being located anywhere. Recall that collateral is classified under
Article 9 of the forum state, and no state other than Wyoming currently takes the
position that intangible assets, such as digital assets, may be "located" anywhere.
The only governing law rule that would apply would be Section 9-301 (1)'s

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-103(f).
See id.; Jonathan Gallardo, Blockchain Laws Put Wyoming in Unique Position, CASPER
STAR TRIBUNE (Mar. 11, 2019), trib.com/news/state-and-regional/blockchain-laws-put-wyomingin-unique-position/article-aa3bl3d7-cb39-5bbd-8be4-d089d2a564ab.html [https://perma.cc/
S59Z-HWSS] ('If our wildest dreams came true, Wyoming would turn into a mini Silicon Valley,'
Driskill said. "'If(blockchain) gets growing, I think Wyoming could be that way."').
213
214

215 The Act's use of the ill-defined "physically located" standard rather than Article 9's principal
residence standard is a minor complaint.
216

See Wyo.

STAT. ANN.

§ 34-29-103(f).

217 See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
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debtor-location-rule, which would establish that the state of the debtor's location
218
provides the law governing perfection and priority.
Here are two examples to illustrate:
SP- 1 takes a security interest in virtual currency owned by a debtor
located in Texas. Texas law governs the security agreement. SP- 1
perfects by filing in Texas. SP-2 then takes a security interest
in the same virtual currency. Wyoming law governs the security
agreement. SP-2 perfects by obtaining control under the Act.
21 9
Litigation over priority arises in New York. The New York court would
look to the governing law rules of the forum state (New York's Article 9),
regardless of the respective Texas and Wyoming choices of law of the parties.
New York's Section 9-301 (1) would apply (New York's Section 9-301(2) does not
apply because New York does not recognize virtual currency as an asset that may
be "located" in a state). New York's Section 9-301(1) would direct the court to
apply Texas's perfection and priority rules because the debtor is located in Texas.
Assuming Texas treats virtual currency as a general intangible, Texas law requires
a secured party to file a central financing statement in Texas to perfect a security
interest. SP-2, which failed to file, would have an unperfected security interest
and would be junior to SP-1 under Texas's priority rule, Section 9-322(a)(2).
Notice that the Act is irrelevant in this example.

The analysis would be the same if the litigation arose under Texas law. The
starting point would be Texas's version of Section 9-301(1), which is the same as
New York's Section 9-301(1). The analysis would be the same from there, with
SP-2 having an unperfected security interest and thus junior in priority to SP-1.
These examples make two important points with respect to a priority dispute
involving a debtor located outside of Wyoming as well as litigation over perfection
of security interests under the Act. First, the forum where a party files the action
is extremely important. If the party does not file an action in Wyoming, the Act
should not apply.2 20 Second, by reason of the first point, a secured party should
never rely solely on perfecting its security interest under the Act with respect to any
debtor that is not located in Wyoming. At least where the rights of third parties
are implicated, a court would be justified in ignoring the Act and concluding that
the secured party's security interest was unperfected by reason of failing to file in
221
In other words, a
the state where the debtor was located (or otherwise perfect).
U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (AM. IAw INsT. &

UNIF. IAw COMM'N 2019).
This example will assume that New York and Texas have adopted the model versions of
Sections 9-301 to -307. See id. §§ 9-301 to -307; id. § 9-501(a)(2).
220 See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
218
219

221 See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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secured party who takes control under the Act should also file in the state of the
debtor's location under Article 9, and, in the case of digital securities which may
constitute investment property, obtain control (if possible) under Articles 8 and 9.

d.

Multistate PriorityDisputes in a Wyoming Court

The multistate governing law issues discussed above will likely also affect
priority disputes brought in a Wyoming court.
For example:
Assume SP-1 obtains a security interest in virtual currency in a
non-Wyoming-law governed transaction and perfects by filing
22
in the debtor's location state (Texas). 2 Thereafter, the debtor
grants a security interest to a Wyoming custodian (SP-2) who
perfects by control under the Act. A priority dispute subsequently
arises in a Wyoming court.
As to the question of which state's substantive law applies, Wyoming's Section
9-301(1) provides that perfection in the first transaction is governed by the debtor's
location state-Texas. 22 3 But Wyoming's Section 9-301(2) provides that perfection
in the second transaction is governed by Wyoming since the virtual currency is
deemed to be located in Wyoming under Section 103(f).224 As to the question of
which state's law governs priority, as noted above, under Section 9-301(3)(C), if
collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the law of that jurisdiction governs priority
2 25
of a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral. A Wyoming court would
presumably hold that, since the virtual currency was "located" in Wyoming,
Wyoming law governed the priority dispute. If so, Section 103(a)'s non-temporal
"control is king" rule would give priority to SP-2. That result, however, would be
completely unfair to SP-1, who may have justifiably been wholly unfamiliar with
the Act at the time of its transaction. This example demonstrates how "horrendous
2 26
complications may arise" absent uniformity between states.
There is seemingly nothing that Wyoming can unilaterally do to address this
issue without unraveling the whole governing law structure of its Article 9. As
the discussion in this section highlights, governing law rules for perfection and
priority only work well if states have uniform governing law rules.

222
223
224
225
226

See U.C.C. § 9-301(1).
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-9-301(a)(i) (2019).
See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-9-301(a)(2); U.C.C. § 9-316(a)(2).
U.C.C. § 9-301(3)(C).
See id. § 9-701 cmt. 1.
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Changes in Governing Law

The Act does not address governing law changes. Under the Act, the governing law would presumably change if a custodian was no longer a Wyoming
custodian, a debtor or secured party was no longer physically located in
Wyoming, or a debtor or secured party was no longer incorporated or organized
in Wyoming, in each case as contemplated by Section 103(f).227 To illustrate an
issue that could arise, take an example with virtual currency collateral. As noted,
outside of Wyoming, virtual currency is a general intangible in which a security
interest may be perfected only by filing in the jurisdiction where the debtor
was located.2 28 Under Article 9 (Section 9-316), if the debtor changes its
location, the governing law would change, and the secured party must re-perfect
against the collateral by filing in the debtor's new jurisdiction. 229 Imagine that a
secured party has control under the Act, but the governing law changes under
Section 103(f). In this case, a court should probably applySection 9-316(a), under
which, in most circumstances, the secured party has four months to re-perfect in
the new jurisdiction.2 30

V. OTHER ISSUES WITH THE ACT
A.

Transition Provisions

The Act does not contain any transition provisions. 23 1 As noted, under Article
9, virtual currency is a general intangible.2 32 Before the Act took effect, certain
secured parties undoubtedly held security interests in virtual currency under
security agreements covering "all general intangibles," as that is a common way
to describe collateral in a security agreement. As discussed above, the Act treats
virtual currency as money.2 33 A question arises as to what happened to those
security interests when the Act took effect and changed virtual currency from a
general intangible to money.
The logical place to look for an answer is revised Article 9, which contains
transition provisions addressing similar issues that arose when revised Article 9
took effect in 2001.234 Under Section 9-703(b), a security interest that became

227

228
229
230

See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-103(f).
CLARK & CIARK, supra note 43, at § 7.17,
See U.C.C. § 9-316(a)(2).
Id.

§ 3.

§ 9-316(a).

231 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-101 to -105. Transition provisions are provisions that give
parties guidance in transitioning from a set of laws into a revised or changed set of those laws.
232 See supra notes 42- 43 and accompanying
text.

§ 3 4 -29-102(a)(iii).

233

Wyo. STAT. ANN.

234

U.C.C. §§ 9-701 to -709.
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unenforceable or unperfected by reason of revised Article 9 becoming effective
remained a perfected security interest for one year.23 5 It then follows that a
security interest which becomes unenforceable or unperfected would fall away,
absent Article 9's one-year grace period. To establish otherwise would require
practitioners to follow both prior Article 9 and revised Article 9 in order to check
for security interests that might arise.
The same is true of the Act. It would be illogical to allow a security interest
that becomes unenforceable or unperfected under the Act (e.g., a security
interest in virtual currency as a general intangible) to continue after the Act takes
effect. Otherwise, practitioners would be forever obligated to check for security
interests as they existed before the Act and as they exist after the Act. That burden
is too high.
The bottom line is that, as written, a secured party who had a perfected
security interest in general intangibles (but no security interest in money) before
the Act took effect would have no security interest at all after the Act took effect.2 36
The same is true with respect to any other digital assets that changed their Article
9 type under Section 102. Secured parties with security interests in the digital
assets presumably must re-attach and re-perfect their security interests.2 37

B. Consumer Provisions
The Act does not have any express consumer provisions or otherwise
distinguish between consumer and commercial transactions. 238 As background,
the drafters of revised Article 9 spent considerable time contemplating revised
Article 9's implications on consumer transactions, understanding that consumers
needed additional protections with respect to certain rules in Article 9.239 In

235

Id. § 9-703(b). For an example similar to the general intangibles-to-money conversion

discussed here, see Official Comment 2 to § 9-703(b):
Example 1: A pre-effective-date security agreement in a consumer transaction
covers "all securities accounts." The security interest is properly perfected. The
collateral description was adequate under former Article 9 (see former Section
9-115 (3)) but is insufficient under this Article (see Section 9-108(e)(2)). Unless
the debtor authenticates a new security agreement describing the collateral other
than by "type" (or Section 9-203(b)(3) otherwise is satisfied) within the one-year
period following the effective date, the security interest becomes unenforceable at
the end of that period.
Id.

9-703 cmt. 2.
See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-102(a)(iii); U.C.C.

§ 9-703.
34-29-102(a)(i), (ii); U.C.C. § 9-703.
238 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-29-101
to -105.
239 See generally U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(26); Symposium: Commercial Calamities, The Consumer
Compromise in Revised U. CC Article 9: The Shame ofItAll, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 215 (2007).
236
237

See Wvo.

STAT. ANN. §5
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doing so, the drafters added some important consumer protection provisions.
For example, Article 9 limits creditor overreaching in a consumer transaction by
prohibiting a security agreement from broadly describing collateral as consumer
2 40
goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or commodity account.
Article 9 instead requires a more specific description for collateral that falls
within these asset types.2 41 Similarly, Article 9 prohibits after-acquired property
clauses for most consumer goods. 2 42 Lastly, Article 9 provides a consumer take
free rule (the "garage sale rule" previously referenced) that makes it fairly easy for
consumers to buy consumer goods free of existing security interests.2 43
A transaction involving digital assets for consumer purposes is presumably
subject to any Article 9 consumer protection provisions that apply to investment
property, money, or general intangibles. But the issues discussed above, among
other consumer issues, deserve consideration in connection with digital assets.
A security agreement may presumably describe collateral as "all money," thereby
picking up all of a consumer debtor's virtual currency. Should that be permitted?
Because the Act allows filing as a method of perfection, a secured party could
obtain a fully perfected security interest without the debtor even realizing
it." That might be a bad policy that permits creditor overreaching. Further,
should a secured party be allowed to take a security interest in a consumer's afteracquired digital assets? Lastly, as discussed in Part IV of this Article, should a
consumer be able to buy digital consumer assets from another consumer free of
security interests?

C ControlProvisions
The Act does not impose any duties on a secured party with control of a
digital asset under Section 103.245 In contrast, Article 9 imposes certain duties on
a secured party with control of certain collateral under Articles 8 and 9. Those
sections require a secured party with control to account for received proceeds and
to relinquish control after a secured obligation is paid. 2 46 Those sections do not
apply to control under the Act because they specifically reference control under
specific sections of Article 9.247 However, the Act's drafters presumably would

See U.C.C. § 9-108(e)(2).
Id § 9-108 cmt. 5 ("Subsection (e) requires greater specificity of description in order to
prevent debtors from inadvertently encumbering certain property.").
240
241

24
243

Id. § 9-204(b)(1).
See id § 9-320(b).

244

See Wyo.

245

See id. %§ 34-29-101 to -105.
U.C.C. § 9-207(c)(2); id. § 9-208.

24
247

STAT. ANN.

§

34-29-103(c) (2019).

E.g., id. § 9-207(c) ("[A] secured party having ...

control of collateral under Section 9-104,

9-105, 9-106, or 9-107 ..... ).
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have wanted similar provisions to apply when a secured party holds control of
digital assets. Notably, Section 104(j) contains a provision relating to proceeds of
digital assets held by a bank custodian.2 48

D. Default and Remedies Provisions
The Act does not contain any default or remedies provisions. The default
provisions in Part 6 of Article 9 may suffice to govern the exercise of remedies
against certain types of digital assets. 24 9 For example, a secured party with control
of Bitcoin under Section 103 could likely dispose of the Bitcoin in a private
disposition, assuming that Bitcoin "is customarily sold on a recognized market"
as Article 9 requires.2 50 It is worth considering whether the secured party should
be able to simply apply the U.S. dollar value of the Bitcoin to reduce the debt, a
251
remedy available to a secured party with control of a deposit account.
Take the case of a secured party with a security interest perfected only by
filing under Section 103(c) or a secured party with a perfected security interest in
digital assets under Article 9's proceeds rules (but in either case without control).
How would that secured party dispose of a digital asset under Article 9? Assuming
the debtor will not turn over the private key, the secured party will have no choice
but to seek judicial remedies.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article is critical of the Act-particularly the Act's inherent conflicts with
Article 9 as well as the Act's take-free rule, perfection-by-control and perfectionby-filing rules, and governing law rule. Specifically, the Act contains several
definitions which themselves are particularly troubling as they are ambiguous
when read alongside Article 9.252 Next, the classification of digital assets in
Section 102 of the Act is unclear due to the number of assumptions commentators
must make in applying the language to virtual currency and because of its
ambiguous application when read in conjunction with Section 104(f).253
Further, the Act does not consistently follow Article 9's provisions regarding
perfection-by-filing and perfection-by-control, muddling the analysis of priority
25 4
The
in determining which party has primary rights in the same collateral.

248
249

§ 34-29-104(j).
See U.C.C. §§ 9-601 to -624.
Wyo. STAT. ANN.

9-610(c)(2).
9-607(a)(4) (allowing a secured party holding a security interest in a deposit
account held with that secured party to apply the balance of the deposit account to the debt).
252 See supra notes 19-4 1 and accompanying text.
250
251

See id.
See id.

253 See supra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
254

See supra notes 70-156 and accompanying text.
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Act's sloppy drafting also results in major issues in applying the take-free rule
to virtual currency, where it unsuccessfully attempts to apply the UCC takefree rule to digital assets. 255 Another issue arises with respect to governing
law in Section 103(f) of the Act, which does not properly address multi-state
priority disputes and leaves secured parties and Wyoming courts in substandard
positions. 256 Finally, the Act is void of important transition, consumer, control,
and default and remedies provisions, all of which are essential in harmonizing the
Act with longstanding secured transactions laws under Article 9.211
While another article could be written covering how the Wyoming Legislature
might amend the Act to address the issues discussed in this Article, one purpose
of this Article is to point out that, overall, laws affecting the UCC which are not
uniformly adopted tend to cause complications. The Uniform Law Commission
and the American Law Institute have recently formed a joint committee on UCC
and Emerging Technology, which, in October 2019, began studying the need for
amendments to the UCC to accommodate emerging technologies. 258 States like
Wyoming should await the findings of that committee before enacting further
legislation covering digital assets and the UCC. This will ensure the legislation
that is drafted, proposed, and eventually enacted serves the purpose Wyoming
desires, rather than possibly hindering it.

255 See supra notes 157-95 and accompanying text.
256

257

See supra notes 196-230 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 231-51 and accompanying text.

258 See UNIFOM LAw COMM'N, JOINT STUDY COMMITTEE ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES,

(2019), www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/

DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=Obac4fae-3eOf-c7de-93e6-4a621e3608fl&
forceDialog=O [https://perma.cc/9ZGK-ZFVP].
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